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This paper focuses on those persons who suffer injuries from another’s performance 
of contracted government services and whom may not have access to effective 
remedies because of narrow and de-contextualized constructions of when vicarious 
liability and breach of non-delegable duties arise. The need to protect such victims is 
becoming increasingly desperate given the growing reliance on non-standard 
(outsourced) employees to fulfil governmental functions. Non-standard workers are 
not classified as employees. Hence, the employer is not vicariously liable for the 
torts of non-standard workers unless the delegated work entails non-delegable duties. 
Yet, many of the non-standard workers are not truly independent contractors -  they 
are in no different situations than employees in relation to their ability to internalize 
costs associated with their work and compensate those injured in the course of its 
performance.
Constructions of (a) who qualifies as an employee for purposes of vicarious 
liability, and (b) when a non-delegable duty arises have not kept up with this new 
social reality. Unless courts adopt contextualized constructions of who qualifies as 
an employee for purposes of vicarious liability and when non-delegable duties arise, 
public authorities can effectively insulate themselves from liability through 
outsourcing. This will likely leave many of those injured in the course of the 
provision of government services without remedy. Not only would this undermine 
the purposes of vicarious liability and non-delegable duties but more importantly, it 
also indirectly creates immunity for public authorities in their engagement with 
members of the public.
Crown or government immunity, at least in relation to torts committed by its 
employees in the course of their employment, is a thing of the past.1 As Cory J.
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria
1 See Peter W. Hogg & Patrick J. Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 
110. A limited exception in relation to good faith true policy decisions remains. However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned that immunity from tort liability must be narrowly construed 
to avoid indirectly restoring Crown immunity by characterizing every government decision as policy. 
Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 689 at 706 [Just, cited to D.L.R.]; 
Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641. See also Allen M. Linden & Bruce 
Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2006) at 673-75; Peter Hogg,
notes: “The early governmental immunity from tortious liability became intolerable. 
This led to enactment of legislation which imposed liability on the government for its 
acts as though it were a private person or entity.”2 Today, governments are 
vicariously liable for torts committed by their employees in the course of their 
employment in the same way as private individuals and corporate entities.3 Thus, 
victims of tortious conduct committed by public officials can seek redress against the 
government as a right either on the basis of direct or vicarious liability.4 Hogg and 
Monahan describe this change in the law as carrying a significant impact for victims 
of tortious conduct caused by government employees.5 The ability of private 
citizens to sue public authorities provides an opportunity to review government 
actions, promotes accountability of government agencies and their employees and 
avoids unnecessarily disadvantaging those who become victims of governmental 
activities.6 Government agencies and their employees are now engaged in a wide 
range of activities that involve direct and indirect contact with members of the 
public. In fact, government agencies may be in a better position to protect the public 
from the myriad and difficult situations often involved in providing public services.7 
However, there is also an increased risk of injury to members of the public from the 
activities of public authorities.
Treating all tort victims in the same manner, regardless of the identity of the 
wrongdoers or the entity on whose behalf wrongdoers were acting, is an important 
equality principle and consistent with Dicey’s idea that governments (and its 
officials) should be subject to the same law as private citizens.8 Even prior to 
abolition of Crown immunity,9 vicarious liability of the government was achieved 
through the practice of the Crown standing behind its servants who incurred tort
“Government Liability: Assimilating Crown and Subject” (1994) 16 Adv. Q. 366 at 373; David Cohen 
& J.C. Smith, “Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public Law” (1986) 64(1) 
Can. Bar Rev. 1 at 2 & 4.
2 Just, ibid, at 704, per Cory J.
3 See G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 284-85.
4 Quebec v. R. (1894) 24 S.C.R. 420 at 449. See also R. v. Armstrong (1908), 40 S.C.R. 229; R. v. 
Desrosiers (1908), 41 S.C.R. 71.
5 Hogg & Monahan, supra note 1 at 127.
6 See Hogg, supra note 1 at 366-67.
7 See Just, supra note 1 at 704 (per Cory J.) See also Stephen Todd, “Liability in Tort of Public Bodies” 
in Nicholas J. Mullaney & Allen M. Linden, eds., Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John Fleming 
(Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998) at 36.
8 See Hogg & Monahan, supra note 1 at 1-4.
9 The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (United Kingdom) abolished Crown immunity and thereby made it 
possible for tortious liability to be imposed on the government for direct and vicarious liability. The 
United Kingdom example spurred similar legislation in Canada and other Commonwealth countries 
such as Australia and New Zealand. See Hogg & Monahan, supra note 1 at 110-14.
liability in the course of their work.10 In Canada, the Exchequer Court Act 1887,n 
as amended in 1938,12 imposed vicarious liability on the federal Crown for 
negligence of its servants in the course of their work. Vicarious liability of the 
government is an important equality principle and legislative developments that 
purposely or effectively immunize governments from liability for its employees are 
considered contrary to public policy and indefensible because they deny innocent 
victims redress. The practice has been to preserve vicarious liability even where 
government employees are specifically immune from liability for torts committed in 
the course of their employment.13
The emerging phenomenon of privatization and outsourcing of governmental 
functions to persons typically characterized as independent contractors undermines 
access to effective compensation. Persons working under privatized regimes, though 
legally characterized as independent contractors, do not fit that categorization as it 
has traditionally been understood. Many of the so-called independent contractors 
may be individuals providing services and not necessarily carrying out business 
ventures with opportunities for cost internalization and loss spreading. These 
individuals are not often in a position to satisfy tort judgments against them. The 
increasing use of these workers to provide public services also raises a more 
fundamental issue: Is it fair to make liability arising from inherent risks associated 
with the provision of certain public services fall on the shoulders of these so called 
independent contractors?
Liability on the basis of a breach of non-delegable duty provides a further basis 
of compensation; liability of government agencies remains unaffected where the 
activity contracted out is characterized as entailing a non-delegable duty of care. 
Courts, however, have been reluctant to recognize statutory non-delegable duty 
absent specific legislative provisions to that effect. Courts have also foreclosed the 
possibility of recognizing a non-delegable duty where a claim for vicarious liability 
has failed. Care must be taken not to unnecessarily limit the scope of vicarious 
liability, and when non-delegable duties arise so as not to unnecessarily frustrate 
access to effective remedies for tort victims.
10 This practice ensured that tort victims of wrongs committed by public servants obtained a remedy in 
many cases (although the action was brought against the employee who committed the tort, the Crown 
defended the action and paid damages awarded against the employee). Hogg & Monahan, supra note 1 
at 7, 110.
11 S.C. 1887, c. 16, s. 16(c).
12 S.C. 1938, c. 28, s. 1.
13 This may be achieved through express legislative provisions, judicial interpretations that recognize 
vicarious liability of governments notwithstanding immunity of public servants or narrow 
interpretations of immunity provisions. See Hogg & Monahan, supra note 1 at 120-21; Hill v. British 
Columbia (1997), 148 D.L.R. (4th) 337 (B.C.C.A.); Chaput v. Romain, [1953] S.C.R. 834, 1 D.L.R. 
(2d) 241; Lang v. Burch et al. (1982) 140 D.L.R. (3d) 325 (Sask. C.A.).
This paper considers the current law with regards to employee tortfeasors and 
the triggering of vicarious liability. Reference will be made to recent contextual 
constructions of what constitutes torts committed “in the course of one’s 
employment” sufficient to trigger vicarious liability for intentional and often criminal 
wrongdoing. The enlightened constructions have been motivated by instrumentalist 
concerns of justice to victims; to ensure that they receive effective compensation. I 
argue that similar considerations ought to apply in relation to the construction of who 
qualifies as an employee or when a person should be considered as an independent 
contractor. A contextualized understanding of when a worker should be considered 
an employee or independent contractor in ways that protect the interests of 
vulnerable victims is consistent with changing social realities.
Part I explores the persistence of vicarious liability, a form of strict liability, in 
the predominantly fault-based modem tort law. In Part II, the the paper discusses 
employers’ liability for the torts of independent contractors and the rationale for this 
exception. Part III explores the relationship between non-delegable duties and 
vicarious liability. In Part IV, the paper considers when workers are characterized as 
employees to trigger vicarious liability, and when non-delegable duties arise. Part V 
discusses the changing patterns of employment in both private and public sectors, 
how that could effectively privatize liability for foreseeable risks associated with the 
provision of public services and how that could also undermine liability of public 
authorities. Part VI explores the importance of contextualizing the status of 
workers. In part VII, the non-availability of vicarious liability for the torts of foster 
parents is used to highlight potential risks of privatizing govermental services. The 
conclusion, emphasizes the need for contextual analysis consistent with the goals of 
vicarious liability, non-delegable duties and governmental liability.
I. SURVIVAL OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN MODERN TORT LAW
Modem tort law is fault-based. This is premised on the individualistic basis of 
classical liberalism which emphasizes personal responsibility and agency. The 
notion that there should be no liability without fault became entrenched in the 
common law by the 19th century; which reflected the necessities of a rapidly 
expanding society and the need to encourage private enterprise and risk taking. 
Grounding tort liability in personal fault also reflected opposition to the system of 
strict liability that had hitherto constituted the basis of tort law and served as an 
attempt to bring the basis of tort liability in line with moral principles.14 Therefore, 
the fault principle provides a moral foundation for tort law and grounds tort liability 
in corrective justice; it provides a reason why one party, the tortfeasor, should be 
singled out to bear responsibility for another’s losses.
Notwithstanding the centrality of the fault principle in assigning liability in 
modem tort law, liability is not always premised on fault. According to the doctrine
14 See James Ames Barr, “Law and Morals” (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97 at 98-99; Richard Epstein, A 
Theory of Strict Liability (San Francisco, Calif.: Cato Institute, 1980) at 5.
of vicarious liability, legal liability may be imposed on one party (an employer), for 
the wrongs that another person (an employee), committed in the course of their 
employment. Liability, in this context, is strict and based not on the personal fault of 
employers, but rather on their relationship with the primary wrongdoer. Thus, 
vicarious liability can arise even where the employer has taken all the necessary 
precautions to avoid the outcome in question.15 Given the philosophical basis of 
modem tort law as grounded in the fault principle and corrective justice, the basis 
and persistence of vicarious liability in modern tort law appears anomalous.16 
However, the reason for the continued presence of the concept of vicarious liability 
in tort law becomes less mysterious when we realize that corrective justice is only 
one of the foundational concepts underlying modem tort law.
Corrective justice does not adequately explain modem tort law; for instance, 
issues of causation, breach and assignments of responsibility involve considerations 
of distributive justice. In fact, even essentialists concede that it is necessary to look 
beyond the confines of corrective justice to provide practical solutions in particular 
cases.17 Thus, a conceptual basis, other than corrective justice, might be required to 
justify compensation for personal injuries.18 Modem tort law is equally grounded in 
distributive justice -  the idea that tort law exists to serve utilitarian goals.19 Thus, 
the goals of modem tort law include redistribution of resources, usually through the 
mechanism of loss spreading. Vicarious liability is one such aspect of modem tort 
law that is premised on distributional considerations; it is aimed at providing a just 
and practical remedy to victims of tortious conduct committed by employees in the 
course of their work.20 Departure from the fault principle is justified on grounds of
15 See John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed. (Sydney, Australia: LBC Information Services, 1998) 
at 412; Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 1 at 552-53; Bruce Feldthusen, “Vicarious Liability for 
Sexual Torts” in Nicholas J. Mullanay & Allen M. Linden eds. Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John 
Fleming (Sydney, Australia: LBC Information Services, 1998) 221 at 222; Fridman, supra note 3 at 
276-77; Sweeney v. Boylan Nominees Pty, [2006] HCA 19 at para. 35, Kirby J., dissenting [Sweeney]. 
Robert Flannigan, “Enterprise Control: The Servant -  Independent Contractor Distinction” (1987) 37 
Univ. of Toronto LJ. 25 at 26-31. Employers remain personally liable if they fail to exercise due care 
in pursuing their activities. However, as Flannigan notes, it is often difficult if not impossible to prove 
lack of due care on the part of employers to support findings of liability in negligence for torts of their 
employees. In this sense, vicarious liability exists as a mechanism to regulate employers’ risk-taking.
16 Vicarious liability predates the fault principle but it has survived despite the prevalence of the fault 
principle. There does not appear to be any indication that it is going to be abolished anytime soon. See 
Jason Neyers, “A Theory of Vicarious Liability” (2005) 43 Alberta L. Rev. 287 at 288; see also 
references supra note 4.
17 Izhak Englard, The Philosophy of Tort Law (Dartmouth Publishing, 1994) at 11, 14-15.
18 Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 
31.
19 Cooper-Stephenson, ibid at 29-32.
20 Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 45 at para. 30 [Bazley, cited to D.L.R.] The 
principle of indemnification by the employee seems to undermine the distributional goals of vicarious 
liability because for the most part the employee would not be in a different situation from the plaintiff. 
This is precisely why applicability of the indemnification principle is questionable and hardly enforced 
in many jurisdictions. See Neyers, supra note 16 at 305-10.
public policy,21 but deployment of public policy is not intended to undermine the 
importance of legal principles.22
The historical origins and philosophical bases of vicarious liability remain 
unclear. There is, however, a general agreement regarding the importance of the 
social goals served by the principle of vicarious liability -  namely, to provide 
effective compensation to those who become casualties in the provision of goods and 
services and to provide effective loss distribution.23 The importance of vicarious 
liability is underscored by the reality that most tortfeasors are judgment-proof, 
leaving many plaintiffs without remedy if their only source of compensation is the 
primary tortfeasor. As Fleming notes, “without vicarious liability many claims 
would go uncompensated as tortfeasors who are neither insured...nor command 
financial resources...are not worth suing. Thus vicarious liability also lends reality to 
what would otherwise be empty claims.”24 In addition, vicarious liability ensures 
that the true costs of an activity are borne by those who benefit from that activity as 
opposed to the individual who “caused” the plaintiffs injuries or the individual who 
suffered an injury.25
21 See Barr, supra note 14 at 109; Fleming, supra note 15 at 410; London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel 
International Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 261 at 281, La Forest J., concurring, 
dissenting in part [London Drugs, cited to D.L.R.].; James Street Hardware & Furniture Co. v. Spizziri 
(1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 641 at 650 (HC), varied on appeal on other grounds (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 385 
(C.A.). See also Hollis v. Vabu Pty Ltd. (2001) 207 C.L.R. 21 at 35 (para. 35) (H.C.A.) [Hollis].
22 See Bazley, supra note 20 at paras. 26-27.
23 See Imperial Chemical Industries v. Shatwell, [1964] 2 All E.R. 999 at 1011-12, per Lord Pearce; 
Bazley, supra note 20 at 58-61; P.S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London: 
Butterworths, 1967) at 12; Fleming, supra note 15 at 410; Fridman, supra note 3 at 278; Linden & 
Feldthusen, supra note 1 at 553; Ewan McKendrick, “Vicarious Liability and Independent 
Contractors” (1990), 53 Mod. L. Rev. 770 at 784. A distinction must be made between the 
rationale/justification for and effect of vicarious liability. The victim compensation and loss 
distribution rationales for vicarious liability have been criticized as unsatisfactory, among other things, 
because they fail to explain why the choice of the employer as the source of compensation is preferable 
when that purpose could equally be achieved through other means such as publicly funded general 
accident compensation schemes. As well, there does not appear to be any reason why liability should 
be limited to torts committed in the course of employment nor that the choice of the employers as a 
source of compensation is more efficient than other sources of compensation. See Flannigan, supra 
note 15 at 28-29; Neyers, supra note 16 at 292-93, 296-97. Notwithstanding these critiques, vicarious 
liability would often be a practical mechanism for accessing effective compensation from a victim’s 
perspective regardless of whether the same outcome could have been achieved from other sources that 
may even be more cost efficient, including social security schemes. For now, there is no universal 
accident compensation scheme and many victims may go uncompensated in the absence of vicarious 
liability.
24 Fleming, supra note 15 at 411.
25 Though not explicitly stated, the purpose of vicarious liability appears to be to relieve employees from 
the risk of personal liability while at the same time ensuring that victims are adequately compensated 
for injuries arising in the course of the employee’s employment. Theoretically, the wrongdoing 
employee is a joint tortfeasor with the employer held vicariously liable for their torts and the latter 
retains a right of indemnification against the former at common law: Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold 
Storage Co., [1957] 1 All E.R. 125 (H.L.); McFee v. Joss, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 1059 (Ont. C.A.); Lewis 
Klar, Tort Law, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2003) at 581. However, this principle is rarely 
enforced and its correctness has been doubted. Legislation has been enacted in some jurisdictions to
Although the various rationales for vicarious liability -  compensation, 
deterrence, loss spreading and enterprise liability -  have not been found to be 
entirely satisfactory, the doctrine can still be justified as a matter of personal and 
social responsibility and is consistent with the instrumentalist view of tort law.26 
Vicarious liability is therefore consistent with distributive justice and supports the 
view of tort law as a mechanism for loss spreading and compensation. Courts have 
been creative in expanding the scope of liability in cases where plaintiffs would have 
otherwise not had a practical remedy because the wrongdoer was judgment-proof or 
even dead. Vicarious liability for intentional and criminal conduct, including 
physical and sexual abuse committed by employees on vulnerable children entrusted 
to their care, has tested the limits of the doctrine in recent times. Such conduct is not 
authorized by employers and is usually contrary to the employers’ enterprise. Faced 
with the possibility of a finding of no vicarious liability against an organization for 
an employee’s sexual abuse of children, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged 
the limitations of the Salmond test in light of the new social reality of institutional 
care and abuses. The Court held that when precedent was inconclusive in 
determining the issue of liability, an alternative test based on public policy should be 
applied.27 Specifically, the question of whether there should be vicarious liability is 
based on an assessment of the level of risk entailed in the employer’s enterprise 
using the close connection test. Vicarious liability will generally be warranted 
“where there is a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a 
risk” and the resulting abuse so as to make it fair and just to impose vicarious 
liability on the employer in the circumstances.28 In support of the social justice 
goals served by the close connection test, Cane notes:
bar actions for indemnification against employees for whose tort an employer has been held 
vicariously liable. See London Drugs, supra note 21 at 283-84; Atiyah, supra note 23 at 426; Fleming, 
supra note 15 at 299-300; Francis Trindade & Peter Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia, 3rd ed. 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 744; Neyers, supra note 16 at 305-07; Employees 
Liability Act 1991 (N.S.W.), section 3.
26 See Feldthusen, supra note 15 at 225-28. See also Peter Cane, “Vicarious Liability for Sexual 
Assault” (2000), 116 L.Q.R. 21 at 25, who sees the close connection test for vicarious liability as 
consistent with “the model of tort law as a set of ethical principles of personal responsibility..
27 Bazley, supra note 20 at para. 41. See also Fridman, supra note 3 at 297. In Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd.,
[2001] UKHL 22, 2 All E.R. 769 [Lister], the House of Lords adopted the close connection test 
enunciated in Bazley to impose vicarious liability on an employer in respect of intentional wrongdoing 
of its employee. But the High Court of Australia rejected this approach in New South Wales v. Lepore; 
Samin v. Queensland; Rich v. Queensland (2003), 195 A.L.R. 412 (H.C.A.) [Lepore]. Among other 
things, the Court found the distinction between the job-related opportunity to commit a tort (which 
does not attract vicarious liability) and the employer’s creation or enhancement of the risk that an 
employee will commit a tort of the kind complained of (which attracts vicarious liability) was not 
convincing (per Gaudron J. and Gummow and Hayne JJ.) There were also concerns that the close 
connection test would create uncertainty in the law (per Callinnan J.). See also Nicholas 
McBride,“Vicarious Liability in England and Australia” (2003), 62 Camb. L.J. 255 at 260, who echoes 
this criticism.
28 Bazley, supra note 20 at para 41. McLachlin C.J.C., echoed those sentiments in her dissenting 
judgment in Jacobi v. Griffiths [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 71 at para. 24 [Jacobi]. The 
progressive position in Bazley regarding when abuse will be considered to have occurred in the course 
of the wrongdoer’s employment to justify vicarious liability may be blunted by emphasis on formal 
terms of the tortfeasor’s employment contract. Courts have declined to consider abuse as a
Whatever the ‘policy rationales’ for vicarious liability, the close 
connection test defines those circumstances in which it is fair to hold an 
employer liable for the tort of an employee. Even though the employer 
may not have been ‘at fault’, it may still be ‘fair’ in certain circumstances 
that the employer should bear financial responsibility for harm caused by 
tortious conduct of its employees. Such responsibility is not fairly imposed 
simply because the plaintiff has been harmed; and its fairness does not 
depend on the ability or inability of the employer or tortfeasor respectively 
to compensate for the harm... Rather it depends on a balancing of interests 
of the injured person on the one hand and the employer on the other 
against the background of wider social concerns...liability depends on 
who they [employers] are and what they have done not on what they can 
afford.29
The scope of vicarious liability has been signifigantly expanded with the courts 
finding liablity for the intentional and criminal wrongdoing of employees (often 
undertaken for their own personal and selfish gratification), especially regarding the 
sexual abuse of vulnerable children. This has been applauded as a socially desirable 
outcome and supported on the basis of social justice.30 Consistent with the 
underlying policy for vicarious liability, the expanded scope of liability has been 
influenced and justified by practical considerations to provide effective 
compensation for innocent victims who are often the least able to protect 
themselves.31
materialization of risks introduced or enhanced by the employers’ enterprise to warrant vicarious 
liability where the pepertrators’ assigned duties or formal job descriptions do not put them in direct 
and/or unsupervised contact with the victims. See E.B. v. Order o f the Oblates o f Mary Immaculate in 
the Province of British Columbia, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 45, 258 D.L.R. (4th) 385. This is overly formalistic 
and could undermine the purpose of vicarious liability especially where vulnerable children are placed 
in the same environment with adults who the children perceive as part of the institution that wields 
power and authority over them. Children in those circumstances do not know, and probably do not 
care, about the assigned duties of individual staff members so long as they see them as part of the 
power structure at the institution. Where the nature of an institution or a situation created by an 
employer puts vulnerable persons at risk of abuse, determination of whether the enterprise liability risk 
test has been satisfied should not hinge too closely on the tortfeasor’s formally assigned duties and 
responsibilities. Emphasis must equally be on the de facto power and control exercised by the 
employee over the victim.
29 Cane, supra note 26 at 25-26. See also Greg M. Dickenson, “Precedent or Policy? Supreme Court 
Divided on Rules of Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse by Employees of Non-Profit Organizations” 
(1999-2000), 10 Education & Law Journal, 137 at 148.
30 For example, see Paula Giliker, “Rough Justice in an Unjust World” (2002), 65 Mod. L. Rev. 269 at 
278. In fact, many if not all of the institutional abuse cases that have recently come to light and for 
which victims are currently seeking compensation would not be possible in the absence of such a 
principled basis of vicarious liability. The institutions that employed the wrongdoers are often the 
effective defendants in these cases, either because the actual tortfeasors are dead, in prison or simply 
impecunious.
31 See Kooragang Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Richardson & Wrench Ltd., [1981] 3 All E.R. 65 at 68 (P.C.), 
where Lord Wilberforce notes that the courts have adopted a progressive and liberal approach towards 
vicarious liability of employers with the goal of protecting innocent victims.
II. EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY FOR THE TORTS OF INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS
Generally, employers are not held vicariously Habile for torts committed by 
independent contractors.32 Independent contractors manage their own business and 
assume financial risks; employees, on the other hand, do not assume such risks 
because they receive a salary or wages for their services. A worker is considered an 
independent contractor where the employer has no control over how the work is done 
and hence no ability to manage the risks entailed therein. Given the rationales of 
deterrence, and accident prevention (better risk management) that underlie the 
principle of vicarious liability, the imposition of vicarious liability is justified where 
the employer controls not only what is done but also how it is done. In such 
situations, both the risk-taking and management/reduction occur within the 
employer’s enterprise and they must accordingly bear all tort liability arising from 
their activity.33 Since employers benefit from services provided by independent 
contractors they are also expected to bear some of the costs associated with that 
activity; this is often reflected in the price of the contractor’s services.34 In this way, 
the social goals served by vicarious liability -  effective compensation, 
deterrence/accident prevention and efficient loss spreading -  are equally met by 
employers regarding the torts of their employees and independent contractors.
1. The Non-Delegable Duty Exception
The common law rule that an employer is not liable for the torts of independent 
contractors is not absolute. Employers can incur personal liability for negligence in 
selecting, instructing or supervising independent contractors; particularly where they 
instruct the independent contractor to do an unlawful act. The common law also 
recognised another exception in the 19th century, namely the liability of employers 
for harms resulting from breach of non-delegable duties. Although the court did not 
establish the term “non-delegable duty”, the principle is said to have originated from 
Pickard v. Smith,35 where the court held the defendant liable for injuries to the 
plaintiff arising from the negligence of a delivery man who had left a trap door
32 See St. John (City) v. Donald, [1926] S.C.R. 371 at 383 [Sf. John (City)]; Gilbert Plains (Rural 
Municipality) v. Rohl Construction Ltd. (1999), 140 Man. R. (2d) 102 at para. 38 (C.A.), affirmed 
(2000), 153 Man R. (2d) 128 (C.A.) [Gilbert Plains]; Atiyah, supra note 23 at 327.
33 See 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983, 204 D.L.R. (4th) 542 at 
553-54 [Sagaz, cited to D.L.R.]; Flannigan, supra note 15 at 31-35.
34 This is perceived to be preferable to vicarious liability because it is more efficient for the contractor 
(who is most familiar with the risks associated with their activity) to obtain liability insurance, which 
makes the contractor the most able to offer effective compensation to victims. The goals of accident 
prevention and loss spreading are also satisfied because independent contractors, being on the frontline 
of the activity, are in the best position to adopt mechanisms and strategies to minimize accidents and 
are also able to spread the losses through prices for their goods and services. See Fleming, supra note 
15 at 433.
35 Pickard v. Smith (1861) 10 C.B. (N.S.) 470, 142 E.R. 535 [Pickard].
unattended. Subsequently, in Dalton v. Angus,36 Lord Blackburn, relying in part on 
Pickard, stated the principle as follows:
a person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts on him a 
duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him of seeing that 
duty performed by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the 
contractor that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity 
from him if it is not performed, but he cannot thereby relieve himself from 
liability to those injured by the failure to perform it.3
A non-delegable duty arises where the law imposes on one person a duty not 
only to take care but also to ensure that care is taken in executing a particular task or 
in relation to certain persons. Although there is no closed category of duties 
characterized as non-delegable, such a duty has been recognized in relation to public 
authorities where the power or duty in question is imposed by statute. Non­
delegable duties may also arise at common law.39 The basis of non-delegable duties 
is that responsibility for the activity, which caused the plaintiff s injury, rests with 
the employer. Persons charged with personal responsibility for specified acts may 
delegate the work to others -  such as their own employees or independent 
contractors -  but they remain personally liable for tortious injuries arising from 
negligence or non-performance by the person delegated to carry out the task. Thus, 
in some circumstances, employers cannot avoid liability by delegating work to an 
independent contractor. Similarly, in such circumstances the exercise of reasonable 
care in the selection and instruction of independent contractors does not relieve 
employers of liability for the tortious conduct of independent contractors.41
Non-delegable duties give rise to strict liability because courts may impose 
liability in spite of absence of personal fault on the part of the employer. 
Justification for this principle is doubted by some, and has been described as
36 Dalton v. Angus & Co. (1881) 6 App. Cas. 740, [1881-85] ALL E.R. 1 [Dalton, cited to App. Cas.]. 
An employer contracted out some construction work in a residential area. The work was done 
negligently, resulting in loss of support to a neighbour’s property. The employer argued that he was 
not liable for collateral negligence, since there was no relationship of master and servant. He was still 
found liable for the worker’s negligence.
37 Dalton, ibid at 829. This principle has been restated in many subsequent cases. For examples, see 
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Company, Limited v. English [1938] A.C. 57 (H.L) [Wilsons]; Cassidy v. 
Ministry o f Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343 at 363, [1951] 1 All E.R. 574 at 586 (C.A.), Denning L.J., 
[Cassidy, cited to All E.R.].
38 See Hogg & Monahan, supra note 1 at 118.
39 Stevens v. Brodribb Sawmilling, [1986] H.C.A. 1, 160 C.L.R. 16 at para. 26 [Brodribb Sawmilling]; 
Fridman, supra note 3 at 310-11.
40 See Cassidy, supra note 37 at 586, Denning LJ.
41 See Lewis (Guardian ad Litem) v. British Columbia (1997), 153 D.L.R. (4th) 594 at 603 (S.C.C.) 
[Lewis],
irrational, especially in its application to situations involving use of ordinary care.42 
The principle has also been criticized as a “logical fraud”,43 a “disguised form of 
vicarious liability,”44 and its justification as “highly questionable”.45 
Notwithstanding the vociferous criticisms and absence of clear policy justification, 
liability for the torts of independent contractors on the basis of non-delegable duties 
is still part of modem tort law.46 The persistence of the principle of non-delegable 
duty can be logically explained by its unique pragmatic approach in response to the 
special vulnerability of potential victims; it ensures the availability of effective 
compensation for liability arising from tortious conduct of those hired to provide 
services or undertake tasks that employers (specifically, public authorities) are 
expected to provide or perform.47 Responsibility for those services is considered so 
important to the beneficiaries that employers are not permitted to transfer it to those 
who actually carry out the services. Liability attaches to the employer despite 
absence of any control over how the independent contractor actually performs the 
tasks aside from broad instructions of what needs to be done. To do otherwise would 
offend the public’s sense of fairness and justice.48
The basis of non-delegable duty is the existence of a special protective 
relationship between the employer and the victims of the independent contractor’s 
tort, making it appropriate to impose a duty on the former to safeguard the interests 
of latter.49 This special relationship may be grounded in the defendant’s assumption 
of control and responsibility (whether assumed or imputed) for the plaintiffs safety 
in the circumstances because of an inherent risk of harm to plaintiff from the activity 
in question due to her/his vulnerability or dependence on the defendant.50 The
42 See Fleming, supra note 15 at 435; Glanville Williams, “Liability for Independent Contractors” 1956 
Cambridge L.J. 180 at 186, 192.
43 Williams, ibid at 193.
44 Fleming, supra note 15 at 434.
45 Glanville Williams, “Some Reforms in the Law of Torts” (1961) 24 Mod. L.R. 101 at 112-15.
46 Swanton, an advocate of non-delegable duty has urged that the concept should not be dismissed as 
anomalous or unjust. He asserts that rather, it deserves more attention and respect and goes on to 
commend the judges who introduced the concept into the common law for being courageous enough to 
recognise higher tort duties to ensure that care is taken in appropriate circumstances. J.P. Swanton, 
“Non-Delegable Duties: Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors” Pt. II (1991), 4 
Journal of Contract Law 26 at 46 [Swanton, Pt. II]; Jane Wangmann, “Liability for Institutional Child 
Sexual Assault: Where does Lepore Leave Australia?” (2004), 28 Melb. U. L. Rev. 169 at 198-99.
47 See Swanton, Pt. II, ibid at 35; In support of liability on the basis of non-delegable duties, Atiyah, 
supra note 23 at 335, complements the common law for taking such a position because it strikes a 
reasonable balance in this area. See also Swanton, “Non-Delegable Duties: Liability for the 
Negligence of Independent Contractors” Pt. I (1991) Journal of Contract Law 183 at 184 [Swanton, Pt.
I]-
48 See Lepore, supra note 27 at 475, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
49 See Klondis v. State Transport Authority (1984) 154 C.L.R. 672 at para. 33 [Kondis],
50 See St. John (City), supra note 32 at 383; Gilbert Plains, supra note 32 at para. 39. See also Lepore, 
supra note 27 at 449, McHugh J.; Ibid at 687, per Mason J.; Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones 
Pty Ltd (1994), 120 A.L.R. 42 at 62, Mason C.J.C., Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (H.C.A.).
employer’s creation, introduction or enhancement of a foreseeable risk of injury to 
vulnerable persons who may be engaged with the activity in question give rise to an 
assumption of responsibility for the welfare of those placed in harm’s way, and 
hence an affirmative duty to ensure that the risk does not materialize or if it does, to 
provide redress to victims.51
Imposition of this heightened responsibility on the defendant is justified on 
public policy grounds and as a matter of fairness.52 Such liability would also often 
be consistent with the expectation that the employer safeguard the interests of those 
who are likely to be injured by the activity in question and hence the duty to ensure 
that those hired to do the work do so with due care. This is particularly the case in 
the provision of government or public services. Although work may be contracted 
out to independent agencies, it may not be possible for the intended beneficiaries of 
the service to know the status of workers who provide the service; whether they are 
government employees or independent contractors. As well, since members of the 
public see the provision of particular services as being within the jurisdiction of 
specific government departments and agencies, it is reasonable to expect some 
government oversight in how the work is actually done. Further, the initial reaction 
of many victims who have been injured by the activity in question would be to seek 
redress from the government who they understand to be responsible for providing the 
service in issue. This would often provide a timely and effective remedy for victims 
who do not have to worry about the identity of the contractor, whether they are still 
in business or whether they are solvent.53
The above-mentioned factors would seem to support a broad scope for non­
delegable duties, especially where public authorities contract out services, and not 
necessarily limited to situations where a public authority has a legislative duty or 
power to provide a particular service or undertake a particular activity. Employers 
(public authorities that hire independent contractors) are often the only source of 
practical compensation. Hence, plaintiffs unable to establish vicarious liability often 
seek to hold employers liable on the alternative ground of non-delegable duties owed 
directly to the claimant. Plaintiffs seeking to anchor liability on breach of non­
delegable duties have not fared well where courts have rejected their claims for 
vicarious liability.
Recent case law suggests that the wording of legislative provisions under which 
public authorities operate or that governs the relationship between a victim and the 
government body sought to be held liable is determinative of whether a non­
51 See Lepore, supra note 27 at 439-40, Gaudron J A D & S M McLean Pty Ltd v. Meech & Anor, 
[2005] VSCA 305 at paras. 9, 11 (Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, Court of Appeal). See also 
John Murphy, “Juridical Foundations of Common Law Non-Delegable Duties” in Jason Neyers, Erika 
Chamberlain & Stephen Pitel (eds.), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford, U.K.: Hart Publishing, 
2007) at 369.
52 See Lewis, supra note 41 at 609-11.
53 See ibid. at para. 35. See also Atiyah, supra note 23 at 335.
delegable duty exists in the particular circumstances. In the 2003 trilogy on liability 
of public authorities (K.L.B.; Hammer, and M.B.)54 the plaintiffs’ claims for breach 
of non-delegable duties failed, among other things, because the governing statutes 
did not unequivocally impose general non-delegable duties on the public authorities 
in question for the general well-being of children in the defendants’ care. Such non­
delegable duties would have included reasonable efforts to prevent the harms alleged 
by the plaintiffs. The Court’s conclusion of an absence of non-delegable duties in 
the circumstances occurred notwithstanding that the Court had recognized a statutory 
non-delegable duty to ensure the safety and welfare of the children while in the 
defendants’ care.
In both K.L.B and M.B., the governing statute, the Protection of Children Act,55 
imposed specific non-delegable duties on the Superintendent of Child Welfare to 
ensure that the placement of a child in its custody or care meets the needs of the child 
and a duty to report to the Minister when it appears that the placement is not in the 
child’s best interests. Yet, the Court concluded that the Superintendent was not 
under a duty to prevent foster children from being abused by their foster parents or 
others because the legislation does not specifically imposes a general non-delegable 
duty to ensure that no harm befalls children in care through the negligence or abuse 
of foster parents.56 In Hammer, the plaintiff pupil was sexually assaulted by a janitor 
at a public school. The Court found that although the Public School Act57 imposed 
various powers and duties on school boards, including the power to hire and dismiss 
support staff, and children are statutorily required to attend school, the Board is not 
subject to a non-delegable duty to ensure the safety of children while at school. The 
High Court of Australia came to the opposite conclusion when it held that a school 
authority has a non-delegable duty to ensure the safety of children while in school.58
54 K.L.B. et al v. British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403, 2003 SCC 51 [K.L.B]-, E.D.G. v. Hammer, 
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 459 [Hammer]; M.B. v. British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 477, 2003 SCC 53 [M.B.\.
55 Protection o f Children Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 303.
56 M.B., supra note 54 at para. 17.
57 Public School Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 375, now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412
58 Commonwealth v. Introvigne (1982), 150 C.L.R. 258 (H.C.A.). However, in the Lepore trilogy, supra 
note 27, the majority of the High Court confined non-delegable duty to negligent conduct of 
employees. Hence there was no breach of non-delegable duties for the sexual assault of students at 
school by teachers. Although the Australian position appears progressive and consistent with the 
public expectations regarding the safety of children placed in the care of authority figures hired by the 
school board, the exclusion of intentional acts by employees from the scope of the non-delegable 
duties undermines its effectiveness in the area where children are most vulnerable. As well, it does not 
further the general compensatory goals of tort law and specifically, the recognition of non-delegable 
duties. For a criticism of the distinction between negligent and intentional wrongdoing in relation to 
when a breach of non-delegable duty will be triggered, see McBride, supra note 27 at 258. Vicarious 
liability of the employer remains an option and hence a possible source of compensation (Lepore was 
remitted back for consideration of whether the employer could be held vicariously liable in the 
circumstances). But this may not necessarily yield favourable outcomes, especially in relation to 
intentional wrongdoing, among other things, because there was no agreement regarding the use of the 
liberal and policy-based close connection test adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley.
Regardless of courts’ conclusions on the issue of vicarious liability, the 
personal liability of the tortfeasor remains unaffected.59 However, plaintiffs are 
unlikely to fare any better by suing the primary tortfeasor directly because they are 
likely to be judgment-proof. Even if the tortfeasor has personal liability insurance, 
the intentional injury exclusion prohibits indemnification in respect of deliberate and 
criminal conduct. Thus, it is unlikely that the tortfeasor will be able to satisfy 
judgment against them from non-insured assets. These factors increase the 
likelihood that the victimization of vulnerable children by employees of public 
authorities will go uncompensated; this defect could have been easily cured by 
recognition of a non-delegable duty in these circumstances.
2. Source of Statutory Non-Delegable Duties: Commenting on the Canadian 
Approach
The cases in the recent Canadian trilogy were distinguished from Lewis on the 
ground that the relevant statute in Lewis specifically imposed non-delegable duties 
on the defendant whereas no corresponding provisions were found in the statutes 
involved in the trilogy. Although the finding of a non-delegable duty in Lewis was 
anchored primarily on the statutory provisions there was no indication that it could 
be the only source of the duty. Rather than follow the categorical approach that had 
characterized this area up to that point, in Lewis, Cory J. sought to identify a unifying 
theme in situations where a non-delegable duty has been imposed on employers for 
the torts of independent contractors. He noted that existence of a non-delegable duty 
“will depend on the nature and extent of the duty owed by the defendant.”60 Where 
the defendant is acting under a statutory authority, the existence of a non-delegable 
duty will depend to a large extent on relevant statutory provisions and the 
circumstances of the particular case.61 The common law duty to use reasonable care 
arising from the exercise of statutory authority would not always give rise to a non­
delegable duty. Again, it depends on the circumstances of the case.62 McLachlin J. 
(as she then was) echoed these sentiments in her concurring judgment, noting that 
whether an employer should be subject to a non-delegable duty for the torts of an 
independent contractor should be a contextual enquiry focussing on the relationship 
between the parties to determine if such a duty is warranted in the circumstances.63
59 Liability for breach of non-delegable duty does not affect the liability of the independent contractor; 
the employer retains a right of indemnification. Thus, the real value of non-delegable duty is in 
situations where the contractor is unable to satisfy judgment against them, for example because they 
are insolvent, uninsured, bankrupt or untraceable. Additionally, the ability to fix the employer with 
liability is valuable where there are several contractors involved and it is impractical for victims to 
determine which of them actually caused their loss. This was one of the policy considerations that 
justified recognition of non-delegable duties in Lewis, supra note 41 at 610-11. Even in the latter 
situation, the employer can still seek indemnification against all the contractors, for example on the 
basis of the principle in Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830.
60 Lewis, supra note 41 at paras. 17,20, per Cory J.
61 Ibid, at para. 20.
62 Ibid, at para. 27.
63 Ibid, at para. 53.
In addition to evidence of statutory non-delegable duty for the construction and 
maintenance of highways, the Court also found it necessary to find further grounds to 
anchor liability, namely policy factors. The court referred to the reasonable 
expectation of vulnerable parties in protective relationships as well as the practical 
difficulties that such persons might experience in trying to obtain compensation from 
independent contractors to justify recognition of a non-delegable duty. The risk of 
personal or fatal injury to the motoring public if work is not performed or negligently 
performed was a further reason to justify a non-delegable duty in the circumstances.
It is reasonable to assume that since protective relationships can arise outside of 
statutes, a non-delegable duty could still have been recognized even if the legislation 
in question did not impose such a personal duty for the maintenance of highways on 
the Minister of Highways and Transportation. As McLachlin J.’s approving 
reference to Mason J. in Kondis shows, the ultimate determinant of whether a non­
delegable duty arises is the existence of a special relationship between the parties and 
the defendant’s assumption of responsibility for the plaintiff’s welfare in situations 
where the plaintiff might reasonably expect the defendant to exercise a duty of care. 
In Hammer, McLachlin, C.J.C., noted that the words of the statute must be the 
starting point for the inquiry into whether a statutory non-delegable duty exists in 
particular circumstances.64 However, the statutory provisions cannot be conclusive. 
Ultimately, determining whether a non-delegable duty exists will require a 
contextual analysis focusing on the statutory provisions involved and the 
circumstances of the case.65 Examples of such relevant circumstances would include 
victims’ vulnerability to abuse and the risk of non-compensation due to the 
employer’s use of independent contractors (usually as a matter of convenience) who 
are unable to satisfy judgements. Atiyah notes that to impose liability on employers 
on the basis of non-delegable duties in these circumstances is consistent with 
justice.66
The concept of non-delegable duty therefore presupposes that the victims of the 
independent contractor’s torts are often vulnerable persons who deserve protection of 
their physical and emotional safety and assurance of effective remedies from a 
reliable source in the event of injury.67 Fleming refers to this as a “special protective 
relationship” that gives rise to “a corresponding special reliance or dependence” on
64 Hammer, supra note 54 at paras. 15-21.
65 See Lewis, supra note 41 at 615, McLachlin C.J.C., affirming Cory J.’s principled approach to the 
issue. In her concurring judgment, McLachlin was not as certain as Cory that the relevant statutory 
provisions unequivocally imposed a non-delegable duty on the Ministry of Transportation and 
Highways (she thought the words pointed to a basic direction that the Ministry was charged with road 
maintenance). Notwithstanding the equivocal nature of the statutory provisions, McLachlin still found 
it appropriate to recognise a non-delegable duty in the circumstances based on the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. This suggests that the wording of statutes cannot be taken as 
conclusive of whether a non-delegable duty exists or not.
66 Atiyah, supra note 23 at 334; Swanton. Pt. I, supra note 47 at 186, also notes that such an approach 
may be necessary in light of the changes in employment relationships.
67 See Fleming, supra note 15 at 413,435.
the employer to protect the vulnerable party.68 There does not appear to be a closed 
category of protective relationships for which non-delegable duties arise. This seems 
to be a flexible approach deployed for justice in particular cases where to do 
otherwise would effectively leave plaintiffs without a remedy. No doubt, the 
practical effect of imposing non-delegable duties on an employer would be to 
achieve the same result as if the employer was vicariously liable but this outcome is 
defensible on the ground of fairness to plaintiffs who become unfortunate victims of 
the employer’s enterprise.69 There would also often be a possibility of effective loss 
distribution by the employer in ways that might not be always feasible by the 
independent contractor. This rationale loses its force where the employer is actually 
a vulnerable party with no liability insurance to meet the claim and/or no ability to 
spread losses.70 But this concern does not arise in relation to public authorities.
Thus a careful examination of Lewis demonstrates that the construction of the 
source of statutory non-delegable duties in the trilogy was overly restrictive and 
inconsistent with other case law. An inference of a general non-delegable duty to 
ensure the safety of children in foster care was possible from the specific non­
delegable duties imposed under the legislation applicable in K.L.B. and M.B., all of 
which relate to the safety and welfare of children in care. Additionally, the Court did 
not consider policy or the reasonable expectations of foster children and the general 
public as it did in Lewis.71 Children in care and, more generally, average members 
of the public would likely not appreciate the distinction between an employee and 
independent contractor. As well, foster children will hardly inquire about the precise 
relationship between foster parents and the Superintendent or government agency 
that placed the children in foster care. Rather, they are likely to perceive foster 
parents as part of the government agency responsible for children in care. Hence 
foster children and members of the public likely have reasonable expectations that 
the government will ensure the safety of children it brings into care. For the most 
part, children who are brought into the care of the government do not choose their 
foster parents -  they are placed in homes based upon choices made by their social 
workers and/or availability of foster homes. It does not seem realistic for children in 
care to decline to be placed in foster homes because foster parents are independent 
contractors.
68 Ibid, at 435.
69 See McKendrick, supra note 23 at 773.
70 Since independent contractors are expected to carry their own liability insurance it appears 
unnecessary to protect victims through non-delegable duties. However, independent contractors may 
not always be a practical source of compensation for a variety of reasons. For example, an 
independent contractor may be a shell company that goes out of business, becomes bankrupt or 
discontinues liability insurance. See Fleming, supra note 15 at 434, where he notes that Australian 
courts have been reluctant to follow English and American jurisprudence to impose liability on the 
basis of non-delegable duties in cases involving principals who are neither insured nor in a position to 
spread the losses. Having liability insurance would often be a required term of the contract between 
the principal and the independent contractor. Termination of an insurance policy will constitute a 
breach of contract for which the principal can pursue a remedy. However, such an action is unlikely to 
yield any result because the independent contractor may not have any assets at that point.
71 See Lewis, supra note 41 at para. 33.
Childem in care are vulnerable in other respects as well. It is not uncommon 
for children in care to have been victims of abuse (which could have been the reason 
for their apprehension). In addition to the vulnerability of abuse victims to further 
abuse by the same or other perpetrators, children in care may be even more 
vulnerable in foster homes. This heightened vulnerability stems from, among other 
things, the power and authority that foster parents have over their charges and the 
likelihood of abuse that can result. In K.L.B., Arbour J., in her dissenting judgment 
notes:72
the foster care arrangement reflects the highest possible degrees of power, 
trust and intimacy. The relationship...materially increases the risk that 
foster parents will abuse...some foster parents might impose excessive 
physical discipline on children in a misguided effort to carry out their duty 
to educate and care for [foster] children... Because foster homes generally 
operate free from day-today supervision, some foster parents may believe 
that they can take advantage of foster children without being 
detected...foster children are required to be in the physical custody of 
their foster parents. They have nowhere to go to escape abuse in the short­
term. The power relationship between foster parents and foster children 
gives rise to its own set of concerns: foster children may submit to their 
foster parents even when their foster parents are abusive. Children may 
fear their foster parents more than they would other adults.73
Foster children face the same “potential vulnerability” and “lack of knowledge” 
as highway users, making it reasonable for them to rely on and expect that social 
workers acting on behalf of the Superintendent of Child Welfare will ensure that no 
harm befalls them while in care. It is also reasonable for children to expect to be 
able to look to the Superintendent for redress should they suffer abuse while in care.
Failing to acknowledge the existence of a non-delegable duty absent specific 
legislative provisions ignores the need for fairness in cases such as K.L.B. because it 
effectively denies redress to vulnerable victims placed in harm’s way by public 
authorities. In a way, demanding specific legislative provisions to ground statutory 
non-delegable duty could effectively immunize public authorities from liability 
where services within their legislative authority are out-sourced to so-called 
independent contractors when they would have been liable for the same wrongs if the 
work had been done by their employees. This constitutes privatization of losses
72 The majority decision per McLachlin CJ.C. did not consider whether the abuses in question were 
sufficiently connected with the tortfeasor’s (foster parents) assigned tasks (foster care) as required by 
the enterprise risk test because she dismissed the claim for vicarious liability on the basis that the 
government could not be vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents; she concluded that foster 
parents are properly characterized as independent contractors and not employees. Hence there was no 
need to determine whether the enterprise risk test was satisfied in this case. In her strongly worded 
dissenting judgment, Arbour J. came to the opposite conclusion, holding that the relationship between 
the defendant and tortfeasors was sufficiently close to attract vicarious liability and finding that the 
wrongful activities were sufficiently connected with the foster parents’ assigned duties to justify 
vicarious liability.
73 K.L.B., supra note 54 at 552-53, Arbour J., dissenting.
arising from the exercise of governmental authority or provision of public services 
and leaves the burden on those who can least afford it -  the citizens. It also amounts 
to improper exercise of governmental authority because it is unlikely that the 
governing body or statute under which the employer delegator operates would 
knowingly confer powers to persons who are unlikely to be able to satisfy judgments 
against them.74 This may be inconsistent with the principles of justice, equality and 
common sense that engendered the abolition of governmental immunity in the first 
place. It is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s own reasoning that a public 
authority such as a school board usually has a greater capacity to spread losses 
arising from the performance of its duties.75 This failure as well undermines the 
need to adopt different or contextual analyses in light of certain realities (different 
from the run-of-the-mill situations) to avoid reaching unjust results.76
Although direct (personal) liability of the public authority in negligence, for 
example, in hiring or supervising independent contractors is still an option, it often 
fails to provide victims with a remedy. Generally, courts tend to be protective of 
public authorities and are reluctant to impose liability on them.77 Negligence of 
public authorities is difficult to prove especially where there is an element of 
discretion in the exercise of the power in question. Courts are reluctant to impose 
liability where the injury resulted from failure to act as opposed to positive acts. 
Establishing duty of care for public authorities has proved particularly difficult in the 
aftermath of Cooper v. Hobart; a prima facie duty of care can easily be negated at 
the proximity stage where courts consider whether it is fair and just to impose a 
private law duty of care for the benefit of plaintiffs. Courts have narrowly construed 
duties of public authorities holding that public law duties cannot ground private law 
duties of care absent specific statutory provisions to that effect.78 Even where 
government authorities have been negligent, proving that abuse has occurred and 
establishing a causal link between negligence and abuse suffered by a plaintiff might 
be difficult, especially in relation to abuses that occur in private such as in foster 
homes.79
74 See Atiyah, supra note 23 at 358-59.
75 See Jacobi, supra note 28 at para. 35, Binnie J.
76 See K.L.B., supra note 54 at para. 13, McLachlin C.J.C., referring to Major J.’s direction in Snell v. 
Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at 330, to resort to a “robust and pragmatic approach” to causation in 
difficult cases.
77 For examples refer to the policy/operational distinction by which public authorities enjoy immunity 
from suit in respect of policy decisions and the difficulties of establishing duty of care as evidenced in 
the reformulated Anns test in Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 [Cooper],
78 See Cooper, ibid. at para 44; Rogers v. Faught (2002), 212 D.L.R. (4th) 366 (Ont. C.A.). See also 
Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 1 at 700-01.
79 See K.L.B., supra note 54 at para. 13, McLachlin, C.J.C. This is not to suggest that causation can 
never be established. In fact, in K.L.B., the Court found that risk of harm to the children was 
reasonably foreseeable and that the social workers employed by the government failed to take adequate 
steps to prevent the risk from materializing, for example through proper screening of potential foster 
parents. It was also found that the negligence in question caused the abuse but the plaintiffs’ claims 
for direct negligence by the government ultimately failed because they were statute-barred. In M.B.,
Breach of fiduciary duty is another possible basis of liability against public 
authorities responsible for children in the care of adults who subsequently abuse 
them. However, this action has been effectively foreclosed because it is not 
sustainable where the person sought to be fixed with liability was not at fault and did 
not breach the trust reposed in them for the victim’s protection. This has made it 
impossible for plaintiffs to establish a breach of fiduciary relationship in institutional 
or foster care abuse cases because the fiduciary (the government) does not take 
advantage of the plaintiffs for its personal benefit.80 This reasoning effectively 
leaves abuse victims without a remedy in most cases where the abuse resulted from 
the exercise of delegated authority, unless the delegator can somehow be fixed with 
personal wrongdoing, as for example, where they ignored the plaintiffs complaints 
of abuse or failed to investigate likely abuses by the delagatee.
If the purpose of non-delegable duties is to protect vulnerable victims, then the 
necessity of characterizing particular activities as non-delegable is heightened in 
relation to activities that cannot be insured (for example, intentional and criminal 
conduct). As well, such characterization is wanrranted in relation to delagatees who 
are uninsured and will not be able to satisfy judgments against them from uninsured 
assets, and/or unable to spread the losses to the general public or at least to the 
groups that benefit from the activity in question.81 More importantly, the rise in non­
standard employment as a cheap pool of labour relied on by public and private sector 
employers to meet their labour demands without the corresponding costs has a 
detrimental effect on victims’ right to compensation. Many of those employed under 
casual arrangements are unlikely to have liability insurance or personal assets to 
satisfy damage awards against them.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES AND 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
There is some confusion regarding the difference between non-delegable duties and 
vicarious liability. In E.D.G. v. Hammer, the Court held that a claim for breach of 
non-delegable duty is not sustainable where a claim for vicarious liability has failed 
because the conduct in question was outside the scope of the tortfeasor’s 
employment. This restrictive view of non-delegable duty was premised on an 
assumption that non-delegable duties and vicarious liability have similar conceptual 
bases and goals, with the former only coming into play in circumstances where the
although the trial court found that the social workers were negligent in their monitoring and 
supervision of M.B.’s placement, it concluded that there was no evidence that this negligence caused 
the abuse. M.B. v. British Columbia, [2000] B.C.J. No. 909 (B.C.S.C.). Issue of negligence was not 
appealed.
80 See K.L.B. supra note 54 at para. 50; Hammer, supra note 54 at 563-64.
81 In Lepore, supra note 27 at para. 136, the High Court of Australia held that intentional acts cannot be 
the basis of liability for breach of a non-delegable duty. McHugh J. dissented on this point, holding 
that the non-delegable duty of an educational authority to ensure the safety of school children includes 
responsibility for deliberate harms to pupils even if the conduct in question constitutes a criminal 
offence.
latter is inapplicable because the requisite relationship of employer-employee is 
absent.
The rationale for breach of non-delegable duty is to extend liability for 
torts of independent contractors in appropriate cases where there would be 
vicarious liability if the independent contractor were an employee. I do 
not think that vicarious liability and non-delegable duty should overlap to 
permit inconsistent results for the same tort of an employee. The 
duplication of vicarious liability and non-delegable duty would create 
doctrinal confusion for no valid policy purpose.82
In addition to limiting the applicability of non-delegable duty, this position also 
attempts to preserve doctrinal purity, an approach referred to by the High Court of 
Australia as the doctrine of incompatibility.83 This approach has been criticized as 
unduly restrictive and as undermining the development of the common law.84
The existence of non-delegable duties should not be contingent on the 
availability of vicarious liability in the circumstances. To insist on this requirement 
defeats the purpose of non-delegable duties and renders the principle superfluous. 
As McHugh J. points out in Lepore, the conceptual foundations of the two bases of 
liability are different. Whereas vicarious liability imposes liability on a person for 
another’s tortious conduct (indirect), liability for breach of non-delegable duty is 
direct (personal).85
The liability of the employer of an independent contractor is not properly 
vicarious: the employer is not liable for the contractor’s breach of duty; he 
is liable because he himself has broken his own duty. He is under a 
primary liability, not a secondary one.86
In fact, liability for breach of non-delegable duty appears to be a fall-back 
mechanism in some cases where vicarious liability would be unavailable, and 
fairness and justice dictate that the victim should be entitled to an effective remedy in
82 G.(E.D.) v. Hammer (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 454 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 75, MacKenzie J.A., affirmed on 
appeal.
83 See Sullivan v. Moody (2001) 207 C.L.R. 562 at 580 (H.C.A.), where the Court held that to impose a 
duty of care on a welfare organization for the benefit of a father accused of sexual assault of her child 
would not be compatible with the organisation’s duty to the child and the law of defamation. Gummow 
J. and Hayne J. adopted a similar position in Lepore when they held that extending non-delegable duty 
to intentional torts would be inconsistent with the doctrine of vicarious liability.
84 Prue Vines, “New South Wales v. Lepore; Samin v. Queensland', Rich v. Queensland'. Schools 
Responsibility for Teachers’ Sexual Assault: Non-delegable Duty and Vicarious Liability” (2003), 27 
Melbourne U. L. Rev. 612 at 616.
85 Lepore, supra note 27 at para. 136, Gummow and Hayne JJ. See also Commonwealth of Australia v. 
Introvigne, [1982] H.C.A. 40 at pp. 269-70, Mason J.; Wilsons, supra note 37; Jaman Estate v. 
Hussein [2005] M.J. No. 48 at para. 16 (Q.B.).
86 John William Salmond, Salmond & Heuston on the Law o f Torts, 21st ed. by R.F.V. Heuston and R.A. 
Buckley (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 461.
the circumstances.87 In this sense, the principle of non-delegable duty maintains the 
compensatory focus of tort law by ensuring that victims unable to obtain 
compensation on the basis of vicarious liability can still access effective remedies 
through non-delegable duty. Instrumentalist conceptions of vicarious liability and 
non-delegable duty are particularly important in light of increasing reliance on 
outsourcing to provide essential services that would otherwise have been performed 
by employees. Contracting out governmental services has become common in the 
era of privatization, mostly as a matter of convenience. It is questionable whether 
public authorities should be able to relieve themselves of responsibility for the safety 
of members of the public or, more specifically, those who rely on those services -  
especially when such reliance is engendered and enforced by the state itself, as in the 
case of foster children. In fact, there might be a greater need to protect vulnerable 
members of the public when government services are contracted out. Otherwise, 
public authorities will insulate themselves from liability by contracting out services 
that are likely to produce casualties, leaving victims to seek justice against contracted 
agencies, who may have to bear a disproportionate burden of costs without adequate 
opportunity to spread the losses. Theoretically, contracted agencies are able to 
internalize costs through the prices they charge for their services. However, these 
agencies often operate under market pressures and may face competition from other 
agencies. Hence there may be a limit to how much they can charge for their services 
or the extent of cost internalization they can reflect in their charges, and a limit upon 
their ability to absorb losses or provide effective compensation for persons injured in 
the performance of their work.
IV. WHO QUALIFIES AS AN EMPLOYEE FOR PURPOSES OF
VICARIOUS LIABILITY?
The two preconditions for vicarious liability are: (a) that the person who committed 
the tort in question must be an employee of the person sought to be held vicariously 
liable for the tort; and (b) that the tort was committed in the course of the employee’s 
employment. Triggering the second pre-condition depends on whether the tortfeasor 
qualifies as an employee in the first place. Employees are distinguished from 
independent contractors for a variety of reasons including the purpose of determining 
whether to hold an employer vicariously liable for the torts of others.
As discussed above, an employer is generally not vicariously liable for the torts 
of independent contractors.88 It is generally said that an employee is hired under a 
contract of service whereas an independent contractor is hired under a contract for
87 See Lepore, supra note 27 at 475, Gummow & Hayne JJ, and also at 485, Kirby J. See also Vines, 
supra note 84 at 623.
88 See Williams, supra note 42.
service.89 Traditionally, the element of control has been used to distinguish between 
employees and independent contractors -  an employer-employee relationship exists 
where the former controls not only what the latter does but also how the work is 
done. On the other hand, independent contractors are hired to perform specified 
tasks but the employer does not dictate how the task is to be accomplished.90
The control test was perceived to be determinative of whether a tortfeasor was 
an employee or independent contractor in pre-industrial times.91 It is now 
commonly accepted that the control test is no longer adequate to determine who is an 
employee and who is an independent contractor in the modem economy given the 
highly specialized and professional nature of the modem labour force. In fact, 
meaningful control over the activities of employees is impractical in some situations 
but this does not preclude the characterization of the worker as an employee. Hence, 
vicarious liability can arise even when control is not feasible or desirable.92 The 
basis of vicarious liability has also been adapted in light of the changing realities of 
the modem economy such that a person is still regarded as an employee with the 
corresponding possibility of vicarious liability for the employer even if the latter has 
absolutely no idea of how the former carries out his or her work. Fleming sums up 
the situation of the modem labour force and how the law on vicarious liability has 
adapted to the changing realities:
More often than not, the skilled craftsman or professional worker is 
engaged for the very reason that [they possess] the “know-how” which 
[their] employer lacks. Industrial relations have changed to the point 
where even a crane driver’s assertion “I take no orders from anybody” is 
regarded as the normal attitude of a skilled [person] who knows [their] job 
and will carry it out in [their] way.
The policy underlying vicarious liability would have been jeopardised by a 
literal adherence to the control test, and the courts have not hesitated to 
hold the employer answerable “even though the work which their servant 
is employed to do is of a skilful or technical character, as to the method of 
employing which the employer...is ignorant.” [Footnotes omitted]93
The crucial question is no longer whether the employer supervises the person’s 
work or even whether such supervision is possible. Rather it is whether the
89 See Cassidy, supra note 37 at 579, per Somervell, L.J.; Atiyah, supra note 23 at 35. In Ready Mixed 
Concrete v. Minister o f Pensions, [1968] 1 All E.R. 433 at 439-40 (Q.B.D.), MacKenna J. stated that 
the existence of a contract of service depends on three conditions being met; namely that: (a) the 
worker accepts a wage or remuneration in exchange for his/her skill in performing some service for the 
employer; (b) the worker is subject to the employer’s reasonable control; and (c) an employment 
relationship is not inconsistent with the provisions of the contract.
90 Klar, supra note 25 at 583.
91 See Yewens v. Noakes (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 530 at 532-33.
92 See Fridman, supra note 3 at 277.
93 Fleming, supra note 15 at 414-15.
employer has ultimate authority or right of control over the person performing the 
task - whether that person is subject to the employer’s orders and directions in some 
form, regardless of whether the employer actually exercises that power, or the extent 
to which it is in fact exercised.94 The focus of the inquiry into such status 
characterization is whether the worker is engaged in a separate enterprise, referred to 
as the enterprise risk test.95 The enterprise risk test focuses on the extent of financial 
risk assumed by the worker. This will not always be an appropriate barometer, 
especially in the non-commercial context. In K.L.B. the Court noted that the test 
must be adapted in relation to non-profit endeavours like the government- 
administered foster care system: in such situations the test must be whether the 
tortfeasor was acting on her own account or on behalf of the employer.96
According to Major J. in Sagaz, although the level of control an employer 
exercises over workers is not determinative, it will always be a relevant factor in the 
inquiry.97 Flannigan notes that the requisite degree of control must be sufficiently 
high to justify characterizing the worker as an employee.98 Other factors such as 
ownership of tools used, opportunities to profit and responsibility for financial risk 
will also point to whether the tortfeasor was in business on their own or whether their 
activity is to be considered integral to the employer’s enterprise.99 The 
determination of when an employer-employee relationship exists is to be flexible and 
purposeful bearing in mind the nature of the tasks to be performed and the extent to 
which control in how the work is to be done is feasible and desirable. The nature of 
some tasks is such that it is best to give the employee a substantial degree of 
discretion in how it is to be completed so long as both parties are aware of the 
common goal. The nature of the task to be performed may be such that it would be 
necessary for employees to act on their own terms with little or no room for detailed 
directions or instructions from the employer; yet they will nevertheless be considered
94 According to the High Court of Australia in Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd. (1955) 93 C.L.R. 561 at 
572 (H.C.A.) [Zuijs], control in this context ought to be defined as the right or legal authority to 
control regardless of whether the employer actually exercises that right and regardless of the extent to 
which it actually controls the worker in what he or she does. See also Brodribb Sawmilling, supra note
39 at para. 16.
95 Sagaz, supra note 33 at para. 47.
96 K.L.B., supra note 54 at para. 21, McLachlin, C.J.C. In her dissenting judgment, Arbour J. affirmed the 
need to modify the focus of the enterprise control test in relation to the non-profit activities. However, 
she preferred to focus on whether the tortfeasor was acting on behalf of the employer as opposed to 
whether she was acting on her own account because the former allows the objective of the Sagaz 
inquiry (namely, the imposition of liability on the party responsible for the activity that gave rise to the 
harm) to be meaningfully adapted in the present case. K.L.B., supra note 54 at para. 71.
97 Sagaz, supra note 33 at para. 47. The rationale for the centrality of the element of control in 
determining who is an employee is that it would be unfair to impose vicarious liability on employers 
when they could not have influenced or deterred the tort in question because the worker was pursuing 
his/her own private ends. Sagaz, supra note 33 at para. 35.
98 Flannigan, supra note 15 at 51.
99 See Montreal (City) v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 at para. 19 (Canada P.C.) 
[Locomotive]; Fridman, supra note 3 at 281; Flannigan, supra note 15 at 41-53.
employees so long as the employer retains lawful authority to give ultimate 
directions or instructions when it is possible to do so, and the worker could be 
sanctioned for failure to follow the instructions, for example through dismissal. In 
fact, the work in question may be subject to the idiosyncrasies of the person engaged 
to execute it, such as foster parents subjecting children placed in their care to their 
particular parenting styles so long as it does not compromise the welfare of those 
children. Kidner suggests that perhaps the inquiry should focus not so much on the 
power to direct how work is done but on accountability -  to what extent is the person 
accountable to the party sought to be held vicariously liable.101
Thus, notwithstanding Major J.’s statement in Sagaz that the extent of control 
that the employer exercises over workers will always be a relevant factor in 
determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, he also 
acknowledged that there is no set formula for that inquiry. In addition, the relative 
weight attached to the various factors to be considered depends on the circumstances 
of each case.102 He also cautioned against undue reliance on control of the employer 
over the worker’s activities because such reliance could be misleading. 
Ultimately, the question should be whether, in light of all the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is fair to impose vicarious liability on the employer for the torts of 
a person employed to complete specified tasks.104
The jurisprudence to date shows judicial willingness to consider a broad range 
of factors in making the determination of whether to fix an employer with vicarious 
liability. The goals of vicarious liability (i.e. to provide a practical remedy, that is, 
just and fair compensation to tort victims, and to deter future torts) must inform the 
inquiry into the status of workers. The various goals may sometimes be 
oppositional, but judgment in individual cases must be informed by the relative 
importance of particular factors with the view to doing justice in the 
circumstances.105 This approach could lead to characterizing some workers as 
employees to justify imposition of vicarious liability on the employer in situations 
that may appear to point in the opposite direction.106 Contrary to criticisms that this 
might lead to uncertainty in the law,107 such an outcome is dictated by the interests 
of justice and is consistent with changing patterns of employment relationships in
100 Zuijs, supra note 94 at 571; Fleming, supra note 15 at 415; Trindade & Cane, supra note 25 at 719.
101 Richard Kidner, “Vicarious Liability: for whom should the ‘employer’ be liable?” (1995), 15 Legal 
Stud. 47 at 59
102 Sagaz, supra note 33 at 558.
103 Ibid. at 554.
104 See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 1 at 553.
105 See Klar, supra note 25 at 585-86.
106 See Hollis, supra note 21.
107 See O. Kahn-Freund, “Servants and Independent Contractors” (1951) 14 Mod. L. Rev. 504 at 507; 
Atiyah, supra note 23 at 37.
today’s society. Indeed, as McEachem CJ.B.C. pointed out in Critchley, in spite of 
attempts to distinguish between employees and independent contractors the line may 
be blurred especially in cases of overlapping obligations.108
V. CHANGING PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT
The face of work is changing in the modem economy and so is the relationship 
between employers and workers. There is a growing trend of non-standard 
employment.109 The non-standard workforce consists of part-time workers, 
temporary workers, persons working from home, consultants, freelancers, etc. 
Many, but not all, non-standard workers are also self-employed.110 Non-standard 
workers do not only work in clerical or low-skilled jobs; many are also professionals, 
working in atypical positions. There are both social and economic reasons for the 
increase in non-standard employment.111 Some people choose to work in non­
standard jobs because of the flexibility and other strategic advantages they offer,112 
but many do not choose non-standard employment freely. Rather, market forces 
push many people into non-standard jobs; many businesses and organizations resort 
to non-standard employments allegedly in order to cut costs and stay competitive and 
workers simply take the jobs available to them.113 The increase in non-standard
108 A. (C.) v. Critchley (1998) 60 B.C.L.R. (3d) 92 at 119 (C.A.) [Critchley]. Appeal to SCC discontinued: 
[1999] S.C.C.A. No. 32.
109 Jobs are now defined as standard and non-standard employment. Standard employees work for a single 
employer, work full time, year round and enjoy some measure of job security. They often have benefits 
and opportunities for upward mobility. In contrast, workers with non-standard jobs do not work full 
time for a single employer. Non-standard workers tend to be poorly paid, have little or no benefits and 
do not enjoy job security compared to permanent and full-time employees. Just over half of workers in 
Canada hold standard jobs. See BC Ministry of Education, Making Career Sense o f Labour Market 
Information, “The Shift to Non-Standard Work” by Elaine O’Rielly, 2nd Ed., online: 
<http://www.makingcareersense.org/CHAPTER2/CHAP2-9.HTM>. See also GPI Atlantic, Working 
Time and the Future of Work in Canada: A Nova Scotia Case Study by Linda Pannozzo (2004) at 261-
62 (accessed through University of Victoria electronic library site: http://site.ebrary.com).
110 For rising trend in part-time employment between 2001 and 2005, see Statistics Canada, “Full-time 
and part-time employment by sex and age group”, online: <http://www40.statcan.ca 
/101/cst01/laborl2.htm>. See also Statistics Canada, “Self-employment: historical summary” 
<http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/labor64.htm>; and Statistics Canada, “Self Employment Activity 
in Rural Canada” by Valerie du Plessis (July 2004) 5:5 Rural and Small Town Canada Analysis 
Bulletin, at 3 (Statistics Canada catalogue No. 21-006-XIE), online: <http://www.statcan.ca/cgi- 
bin/downpub/listpub.cgi?catno=21-006-XIE2004005>.
111 See BC Ministry of Education, supra note 109.
112 Changes in social conditions such as rise in dual earner families, younger people having to work to 
support themselves while in school, the need for better work-life balance in light of pressures on 
people’s lives such as child care, caring for elderly relatives, the desire to have independence, 
flexibility and variety in what work they do, and sometimes opportunities for increased income have 
resulted in many workers demanding flexible work arrangements, even within standard employments. 
See BC Ministry of Education, Making Career Sense of Labour Market Information, by Elaine 
O’Rielly, 2nd Ed. Table 1, “Social Trends Affecting Non-Standard Work”, online: 
<http://www.makingcareersense.org/FIGURES/Figures.htm>; and Pannozzo, supra note 109 at 262.
113 See Statistics Canada, “Reasons for part-time work by sex and age group” (2006), online: 
<http://www40.statcan.ca/101 /cstO 1 /labor63a.htm>.
employment is also attributable to the trend of “just-in-time” production by which 
employers and organizations maintain minimal services, stocks or inventory with the 
hope of relying on casual workers to meet unexpected increases in demand. 
Stricter eligibility criteria for income assistance and pressures on welfare recipients 
to participate in the waged labour force also compel people to take whatever jobs are 
available. Many of these jobs tend to be non-standard.
From the perspective of employers, reasons for this emerging phenomenon of 
non-standard employment relationships are many, including cost efficiency, tax 
purposes, not having to pay employment benefits for employees, and the avoidance 
of vicarious liability. Resorting to a non-standard workforce enables employers to 
reduce their costs, increase productivity and stay competitive with lower wages, non­
payment of benefits and reduced over-head costs. Non-standard workers have 
therefore become the “sacrificial lambs” in the modem economy with their desire for 
full-time/permanent employment, higher remuneration and some measure of job 
security subordinated to pressures for economic efficiency and higher profits. As 
England notes: “Today, many employers facing stiffening...competition are 
attempting to increase their productivity by placing the risks associated with their 
business on their workers — for example, by transforming them into self-employed 
casuals...”116 Many of these workers cannot be considered independent contractors 
in the traditional sense of the word - as persons who have chosen to engage in their 
own business ventures.
The phenomenon of non-standard employment has become a mainstay of the 
modem labour market.117 Both private sector employers and government 
departments rely on non-standard workers to provide a variety of services previously 
or otherwise performed by workers in standard positions. Reasons for reliance on 
non-standard employers include efficiency in meeting unexpected increases in 
workload and/or demand for services (just-in-time production or services), the need 
for expertise not readily available in-house, replacing public sector employees on 
temporary absences such as sick and maternity or parental leaves, and to relieve 
taxpayers of the burden of providing for certain services. Government departments 
rely on non-standard employees to provide a wide range of services in key areas such 
as social services, health, education, forestry, environment, communication, and
114 See Pannozzo, supra note 109 at 286.
115 See BC Ministry of Education, supra note 109; Geoffrey England, Individual Employment Law 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at 13.
116 England, ibid at 16.
117 See McKendrick, supra note 23 at 771-72; Hugh Collins, “Independent Contractors and the Challenge 
of Vertical Disintegration” (1990) 10 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 353 at 356-57; Social Development 
Canada, “Flexible Work Arrangements: Gaining Ground” by Brenda Lipsett and Mark Reesor, (April 
1997) 3:1 Applied Research Bulletin, online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/cs/sp/sdc/pkrf/publications 
/bulletins/1997-000020/page03.shtml >
property maintenance. Some services are provided by professionals such as 
architects and engineers while others are provided by non-professionals. Services in 
the latter category may include janitorial, cleaning, building maintenance and repair, 
and grounds maintenance.118
Based on the traditional distinction between employees and independent 
contractors, many workers in the atypical workforce would be characterized as 
independent contractors. Hence, employers will generally not be vicariously liable 
for torts committed by non-standard workers in the execution of their work, no 
matter how central their work might be to the employer’s enterprise or 
organisation.119 Yet, the reality is that many of the workers in this category do not 
fit the traditional conception of independent contractors and may not have the 
financial means to satisfy tort judgments against them -  they may not have liability 
insurance or if they do the coverage might be limited. They are also unlikely to be 
able to satisfy tort judgments against them with uninsured assets. In this sense, the 
situation of many non-standard workers regarding their ability to satisfy judgments 
against them is no different than that of employees. Yet, those injured by the former 
are less likely to receive effective compensation, one of the principal purposes of 
vicarious liability.120 Some of the service providers may be sophisticated business 
organizations with liability insurance or self-insurers who can easily satisfy tort 
liability arising in the course of their work. However, many of them do not fit into 
that category and hence are less likely to be able to satisfy tort judgments against 
them and spread losses effectively. Many of these workers are drawn from an army 
of cheap labour ready to be exploited in the name of economic efficiency. Workers 
in this category have aptly been described as “the contingent labour force” or 
“peripheral workers”.121 The pressures to provide services with the least possible 
costs create a high likelihood of workers cutting comers in order to stay competitive. 
This in turn increases the likelihood of compromising the safety of workers and
118 See Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Management Services, online: 
<http://www.pc.gov.bc.ca/psbAVelcomemat.htm>; Government of Canada, Business Access Canada, 
online: <http://contractscanada.gc.ca/en/contra-e.htm>.
See McKendnck, supra note 23 at 770-72. See also Leichhardt Municipal Council v. Montgomery 
[2007] HCA 6 at para. 98 (per Kirby J.).
120 In rationalizing the distinction between employees and independent contractors, W illiams notes that 
the latter were often entrepreneurs with considerable assets with which they could easily satisfy 
judgments against them compared to employees who are unlikely to be capable of paying judgment 
debts. In fact, in many cases, the contractors were even wealthier than the employers and it therefore 
made sense to call on them to pay for tort damages arising from their wrongdoing. Williams 
acknowledges that some contractors might be insolvent and hence unable to satisfy judgment against 
them. However, this would be rare and not worth changing the rules regarding the distinction between 
employees and independent contractors for purposes of vicarious liability. Williams, supra note 42 at 
195, 198. See also Atiyah, supra note 23 at 334. As already noted, a tort victim will often sue the 
independent contractor if it is practical to do so. Since they can only recover once for their injuries, 
there would be no practical advantage in suing the employer. Even if they choose to sue the employer 
for the torts of the solvent contractor, the employer’s right of indemnification would neutralize their 
liability.
121 Pannozzo, supra note 109 at 261.
members of the public, and hence increased likelihood of injuries.122 It is therefore 
questionable whether such low-level workers who provide essential services for the 
public sector should bear the burden of compensating those who become casualties 
in the provision of “public services” when that could clearly affect their bottom line 
and, in some cases, drive them out of business.
Given the precarious situation of many non-standard workers, it is fair that the 
law considers such workers employees, at least for the purpose of imposing vicarious 
liability for torts arising in the course of their work on employers who ultimately 
benefit from these arrangements.123 In any event, many non-standard employees are 
unlikely to be able to satisfy tort damages without significant costs to them. Victims 
of their torts would often ultimately have to bear the cost of those arrangements.
The rising phenomenon of non-standard workers who are considered 
independent contractors also raises the question of the nature of the distinction 
between employers and independent contractors. Fridman notes that the basis of that 
distinction, namely that an independent contractor exercises discretion in how the 
work is performed, is not sustainable in modem employment relations. At best, the 
element of discretion in determining the status of workers is merely a theoretical 
guide in determining when vicarious liability attaches.124 This points to a malleable 
concept that requires a contextual analysis and should give way to common sense 
and practical considerations. Courts faced similar challenges in characterizing the 
status of workers with the advent of industrialization and the skilled labour force, in 
which employers no longer exercised detailed control over work to be done by their 
employees.125
Society is once again at a similar juncture with the rise in non-standard 
employment and many self-employed workers. Hence, we need to reconsider the 
indicators of status characterization used up until now to determine when an 
employer should be vicariously liable for torts of workers in order not to frustrate the 
social purposes of the principle of vicarious liability. Additionally, part of the 
traditional rationale for maintaining a distinction between employees and 
independent contractors -  namely, the contractor’s supposed ability to satisfy 
judgment either from insured or personal assets -  is no longer sustainable in modem
122 Ibid at 285-86.
123 See Trindade & Cane, supra note 25 at 725.
124 Fridman, supra note 3 at 281-82.
125 As already noted, the primary means of characterising the status of workers -  detailed control over the 
execution of tasks as indicative of employee status -  was no longer adequate to the task and courts 
adapted the test in light of the prevailing realities about employment relationships. Control is no 
longer the sole test for the status of particular workers. Instead, the focus is to be on the totality of the 
relationship -  whether the worker was an integral part of the employer’s organisation (the 
organisational test) or whether they were in business on their own account (entrepreneurial test). Other 
factors such as ownership of tools, mode of payment and extent of risk assumed by workers became 
relevant in determining whether a worker was an employee to justify vicarious liability of the 
employer or independent contractor in which case no such liability arose.
times, at least in relation to many of those now classified as independent contractors. 
Thus, notwithstanding the increasing scope of primary liability of employers, the 
growing number of workers characterized as independent contractors threatens 
victims’ rights to effective compensation unless the law finds some way to hold 
employers liable, for example through an expanded basis for non-delegable duties or 
liberal interpretation of who is an employee for purposes of vicarious liability.126
A reconsideration of the hallmarks of who qualifies as an employee or 
independent contractor and when an employer-employee relationship exists becomes 
more urgent given current patterns of employment that tend to deviate from 
traditional employment relationships. The rising incidence of atypical or non­
standard employment threatens to undermine the social purposes of vicarious 
liability unless the determination of when an employer-employee relationship exists 
is also altered in light of the new social reality.
VI. CONTEXTUALIZING STATUS CHARACTERIZATION AND THE 
EXISTENCE OF NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES
Vicarious liability has often been deployed to protect vulnerable parties in light of 
changing social realities.127 It follows then that it is not unreasonable to adopt a 
contextual approach to determining whether a person is an employee for the purpose 
of vicarious liability or whether the duty in question should be considered non­
delegable to enable the employer to be fixed with liability for loss caused by an 
independent contractor.128 A contextual approach will resolve these issues not in the 
abstract but in relation to the context in which the plaintiffs loss arose. It appears 
that a contextual approach to the question of who is an employee would offend the 
generalist approach of the common law and, more specifically, the definition of an 
employee because among other things, who is an employee may be variously defined 
depending on the context (with a possibility that the definition in one context could 
negatively impact how employee is defined in other contexts). However, this is 
defensible as a sound public policy choice in the interest of protecting innocent 
victims as well as advancing the purposes of the principle of vicarious liability; both 
of which are threatened with the growing number of workers classified as
126 A possible dilemma arises in attempts to broaden the scope of vicarious liability in response to 
changing employment patterns. Employers are increasingly relying on self-employed and casual 
workers specifically to reduce costs and stay competitive. This goal is undermined if courts find 
creative ways to broaden the definition of an employee to make employers vicariously liable for the 
torts of non-standard workers. Employers will likely look for cheaper alternatives such as relocating 
their operations to other jurisdictions or relying heavily on labour-saving technology, both of which 
could lead to unemployment. See England, supra note 115 at 14.
127 For instance consider the factors in Bazley, supra note 20 at para 41, for determining when an 
employer’s liability may be engaged under the enterprise risk liability test -  opportunity that the 
activity in question afforded the person to abuse his/her power, the extent to which the wrongful 
conduct may have furthered the goals of the defendant’s enterprise, and hence be more likely to have 
been committed by the employee, etc.
128 McKendrick, supra note 23 at 782; Kidner, supra note 101 at 54.
independent contractors and with increasingly restrictive interpretations of what 
constitutes non-delegable duties.129 Such a contextual approach would be consistent 
with the origins of vicarious liability, which began as a principle of “social 
convenience and rough justice” as opposed to having a logical or principled basis.
Fleming cautions against status characterization by analogy - relying on 
indicators of employer-employee relationships in some contexts as determinative of 
the existence or non-existence of such a relationship for purposes of vicarious 
liability. The law recognizes a distinction between employees and independent 
contractors in several areas and for different purposes, including workers’ 
compensation benefits, pension benefits, taxation, applicability of employment 
legislation and workplace safety legislation, actions for wrongful dismissal and 
availability of vicarious liability. The policy justification for the distinction varies 
depending on the context. Thus, while it is important to maintain the employee- 
independent contractor distinction in the various contexts, care must be taken not to 
apply policy justifications for the distinction in other areas in determining whether 
vicarious liability is appropriate in particular situations.131 Even in relation to 
vicarious liability, there is a need for a contextual determination of whether liability 
is appropriate in particular relationships because the policy reasons that may justify 
recognition of vicarious liability in one context may be different from what is needed 
to ground liability in other situations.
Factors such as the degree of control exercised by the employer over the 
person’s work, mode of payment, degree of financial risk assumed by the worker, 
whether the person provides her/his own equipment, whether the worker’s service is 
integral to the employer’s organization, self declaration, etc., have generally 
provided sufficient bases for determining whether an employer-employee 
relationship exists in particular contexts and hence whether vicarious liability is 
appropriate. It would, however, be unreasonable to apply these factors in situations 
that do not bear the hallmarks of relationships in which they have generally helped to 
resolve the issue of whether a person is an employee for purposes of vicarious 
liability, especially when innocent plaintiffs may be left without an effective 
remedy.132 There is a tendency or possibility that these factors will be applied in 
ways that defeat the purpose of vicarious liability.133 In fact, some of those whom 
courts perceive as independent contractors may not consider themselves as such or if 
they do, they do not fiilly appreciate the consequences of that classification aside 
from some tax advantages.1 The crucial question should be whether there is good
129 See McKendrick, ibid at 782-84; Kidner, ibid at 55-56.
130 Imperial Chemical Industries v. Shatwell, [1964] 2 All E.R. 999 at 1011-12, per Lord Pearce.
131 Fleming, supra note 15 at 416. See also Atiyah, supra note 23 at 31-33; Trindade & Cane, supra note
25 at 717-718; Flannigan, supra note 15 at 50; England, supra note 115 at 12-13.
132 See Kidner, supra note 101 at 48.
133 See Kidner, ibid., at 49-50,58, commenting on O ’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte, [1983] I.C.R. 728.
134 Kidner, ibid, at 54.
reason for the employer to bear the risk of injury entailed in the work of persons 
hired to do specific tasks in the same way as those employed in the conventional 
sense.135
A possible starting point could be to recognize vicarious liability when the 
activity that produced the plaintiff5 s injury, and hence the tortfeasor, was integral to 
the employer’s organization unless there is good reason to attribute the risk of that 
activity to the worker alone (for example because he or she is an entrepreneur 
carrying on a business on their own account).136 This is not a perfect solution 
because as Atiyah points out, it still leaves unanswered when a worker is to be 
considered integral or part of the employer’s organization.137 It also presupposes 
that the employer has an organized business possibly with a standard workforce and 
occasionally relies on non-standard workers to accomplish its goals. This “solution” 
also fails to provide a satisfactory distinction between employees and independent 
contractors.138 Notwithstanding these flaws, the enquiry would still be a necessary 
exercise. It should also be a case-by-case determination informed by the purposes of 
vicarious liability as a mechanism for allocating accident losses to ensure effective 
compensation for innocent victims.139 According to Atiyah, such an approach is 
consistent with Lord Wright’s decision in Montreal (City of) v. Montreal Locomotive 
Works Ltd.140 to look to a number of factors, none of which can be solely 
determinative of the issue of whether an employer-employee relationship should be 
inferred in particular circumstances.141 As well, given changing employment 
relationships and uniqueness of some employment arrangements, the indicators of an 
employment relationship in particular situations may depart from and sometimes call 
for a reconsideration of precedent but this is necessary to maintain the vitality of the 
law and fairness to parties.142 In commenting on the need for courts to adopt a 
functional approach to the determination of the status of employees to reflect not 
only the policy underlying vicarious liability but also to reflect changing social and 
organizational realities, La Forest J. stated:
the doctrine of vicarious liability, is a judicial creation devised in Holmes' 
phrase, in response to "the felt necessities of the time". In my view, like 
the judges who created the doctrine, it is incumbent on present day judges 
to adapt the law to new and evolving social and organizational realities...
135 Fleming, supra note 15 at 416; Ibid. at 56.
136 Kidner, ibid. at 62.
137 Atiyah, supra note 23 at 38.
138 Trindade & Cane, supra note 25 at 724.
139 See Sagaz, supra note 33 at para. 30.
140 [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (P.C. Canada).
141 Atiyah, supra note 23 at 38-39.
142 See Short v . J & W  Henderson, Ltd. (1946) 62 T.L.R. 427 at 429 (H.L.); Atiyah, supra note 23 at 83.
The courts created the law; it is up to them to adapt it to meet modem 
needs.143
Similarly, in Sweeney, Kirby J. emphasised the need for vicarious liability to 
adapt to the realities of employment relationships in modem society. He noted that 
determinations of when vicarious liability arises must be informed by changing 
social conditions that affect employment relationships in contemporary society.1
The consequences of failure to adopt such a functional approach is made clear 
in the foster care cases - K.L.B. and M.B. - where the court refiised to recognize that 
the government agency that hires foster parents should be vicariously liable for the 
torts of foster parents inflicted upon children placed in their care. The formalistic 
application of the factors outlined in Sagaz, without a broader analysis of the purpose 
of foster care and how the indices of an employer-employee relationship need to be 
adapted in the context of the foster care system effectively immunized the 
government, authority that placed the children in the tortfeasors’ care from liability, 
leaving the plaintiffs without an effective remedy.
VII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR THE TORTS OF FOSTER PARENTS
In K.L.B.,145 the Court held that foster parents are not government employees. Rather 
they are independent contractors. Hence, the government cannot be vicariously liable 
for the tortious conduct of foster parents. Following the Sagaz test the Court held that 
the relationship between foster parents and the government is not sufficiently close to 
justify vicarious liability. The Court emphasized the centrality of control in status 
characterization -  since foster parents operate independently and are not subject to 
directions from the government in their daily activities in their role as foster parents, 
it would be inappropriate to hold the government vicariously liable for their torts. As 
well, the Court noted that other factors identified in Sagaz - ownership of tools, 
hiring of helpers and exercise of managerial authority - all point to a finding that 
governments are not vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents. Although foster 
parents provide a public service, they do so in their own homes. Independence over 
how they parent is key to the purpose of fostering and hence they cannot be 
perceived as acting on behalf of the government in a manner that justifies the 
imposition of vicarious liability.
143 London Drugs, supra note 21 at 267.
144 Sweeney, supra note 15 at para. 37, Kirby J. dissenting.
145 In K.L.B. the plaintiffs became wards of the state. They were placed in foster homes where they were 
abused. The Protection of Children Act obliged the government to make adequate foster care 
arrangements for its wards that meets the needs of such children. The social workers who placed the 
children in the foster homes were found negligent in failing to properly assess the suitability of the 
foster parents before placement and ignoring evidence that the placement might not be in the children’s 
best interests. They also failed to adequately monitor how the children fared in the foster homes. 
Their claim for negligence against the government, however, failed because of statutory limitation 
periods. The plaintiffs also sought to hold the government vicariously liable for the torts of the foster 
parents, for breach of a non-delegable duty owed to them to ensure their safety in foster care and for 
breach of a fiduciary duty. Both actions failed.
The majority in K.L.B. also noted that, in any event, vicarious liability in these 
circumstances would not promote deterrence because it would simply impose 
liability on a party that has no control over how the activity in question is performed 
and who therefore has no means of deterring future abuse. Further, the court noted 
that not only is government control over foster parents not practical but it is also not 
desirable because it is not in the overall interest of society. The threat of liability 
could force governments not to place children in foster care and instead place them 
in environments where they could exercise control over how children are cared for 
such as group homes, even though this would not be ideal for children.146
Arbour J. dissented on the issue of vicarious liability. Unlike the majority, she 
found that it is appropriate to hold governments vicariously liable for the torts of 
foster parents. She noted that although foster parents exercise a great deal of 
independence in their work, a contextual analysis of the relationship shows that they 
act on behalf of the government and should therefore not be considered independent 
contractors. As well, vicarious liability in such circumstances would be consistent 
with the policy rationales for vicarious liability -  fair and just compensation and 
deterrence of future harms. She emphasized that the functional inquiry in Sagaz 
requires a holistic assessment of the relationship between the tortfeasor (i.e. foster 
parents) and the government to determine whether vicarious liability is appropriate in 
the circumstances. A contextual analysis makes it clear that foster parents act on 
behalf of the government regardless of how independently they operate and 
regardless of the fact that they carry out their activities within their own homes. 
Among other things, Arbour J. pointed out that the government remains the legal 
guardian of foster children. This gives the government sufficient power or right of 
control over the care of foster children to justify vicarious liability. Although the 
government does not exercise this right to dictate the day-to-day care of foster 
children it is still involved with their care in a variety of ways including developing 
plans of care for the children, ensuring that their needs are met in foster homes and 
terminating the foster care arrangement if things do not work out well for the 
children.147
The effect of the finding of no vicarious liability against the government in 
K.L.B. essentially left the plaintiffs without a remedy.148 In the words of Kirby J. in
It is worth noting that shifting the care of children in care from the foster care system to a non-home 
based system would not necessarily insulate the government from vicarious liability. In fact, vicarious 
liability has been imposed on employers for abuse in non-home care facilities because workers in those 
settings are readily characterized as employees. See Bazley, supra note 20; Lister, supra note 27.
147 See also Marshall v. Williams Sharpe & Sons, 1991 S.L.T. 114 (Court of Session, Inner House, 
Second Division).
148 As already noted, the plaintiffs attempt to ground liability on breach of non-delegable and fiduciary 
duties also failed. Although the personal liability of the tortfeasors provides another avenue for 
compensation, it was not an option open to these plaintiffs, as in many other such cases. The 
tortfeasors were judgment-proof (some of them were even deceased). Even if the claims were feasible, 
they would have suffered the same fatal blow from the limitation defence as the Court concluded that 
with the exception of the sexual abuse claim, all the others were statute-barred.
Sweeney, such an outcome “is not a proud moment in [the] administration of 
justice.”149 The unfairness of this outcome is made even clearer when one considers 
the status of children placed in foster care; they are frequently vulnerable children 
who have often experienced adversity in their lives or who are from troubled 
backgrounds. Removal from their natural families and placement in foster care is 
supposed to improve their well being and life chances. Yet, the risk of abuse in 
foster care is real. Sadly, some children come out of foster care much worse off and 
yet are often unable to obtain effective redress for the abuse suffered. Such an 
outcome marginalizes an already vulnerable group and should be avoided through a 
contextual analysis of the relationship between tortfeasors and government agencies 
that place children in harm’s way bearing in mind the incredible vulnerability of 
children in such situations.
Even if foster parents are not subject to detailed control by social workers, they 
cannot be said to be carrying out the activity of fostering on their own account or 
considered entrepreneurs who use their own capital and assets to generate profits. As 
Major J. noted in Sagaz, although the element of control is important, it is not 
conclusive in determining the status of a worker in particular circumstances.150 The 
appropriate inquiry in this regard should be whether the person is undertaking the 
activity151 in question on her/his own accord as a business venture that is whether 
they are an entrepreneur, or whether they are acting on behalf of another, the 
employer.152 The focus of the inquiry should not be limited to whether the worker is 
gaining a benefit, but more importantly the kind of benefit they receive relative to the 
risks they assume.153 Similarly, Flannigan notes that the employee-independent 
contractor distinction presumes that the parties are engaged in separate enterprises or 
activities, one conducted by the employer and one by the worker engaged to 
complete the tasks in question.154 “Whenever it can be established that the worker 
conducts a separate enterprise, the limits of the employer’s enterprise will have been 
ascertained and the employer should not be liable for torts attributable to that other 
enterprise. The distinction.. .is based on control.”155 Factors that might elucidate the 
status of particular workers will vary depending on, among other things, the nature of 
the work to be done and the extent of control that is possible in the circumstances. 
This would often require a contextual assessment of the relationship between the
149 Sweeney, supra note 15 at para. 117, Kirby J., dissenting.
150 Sagaz, supra note 33 at 554.
151 I have chosen to use the more encompassing term ‘activity’ as opposed to ‘business’ because the latter 
term connotes a profit generating venture but as is evident from K.L.B. and M.B. issues of status 
characterization can equally arise in relation to non-commercial activities such as fostering.
152 Sagaz, supra note 33 at 558.
153 Kidner, supra note 101 at 57.
154 Flannigan, supra note 15 at 32,41.
155 Flannigan, supra note 15 at 36.
worker and the employer to determine whether the two are engaged in a single 
enterprise or whether they are each carrying out their own activities.156
Realistically, foster parents cannot be said to be engaged in an enterprise 
separate from the mission of government agencies that place children in their care. A 
more realistic view of foster parents accepts that they provide a public service that is 
essential to the government’s responsibility for child protection - providing safe 
home environments for children in care. Given the nature of fostering and its goal of 
replicating the natural home environment, any detailed supervision or control of 
activities of foster parents in relation to foster children will defeat the purpose. In 
United Wholesale Grocers v. Sher, 157 although the employer exercised little if any 
control over the worker in question, who was a casual employee and used his own 
tools, he was nevertheless found to be an employee for purposes of vicarious liability 
because he was “part and parcel” of the defendant’s business and not working on his 
own account. The organizational test -  the necessity of the activity that generated 
the plaintiff s loss to the defendant’s overall enterprise - is not sufficient to ground 
the characterization of the worker as an employee to justify vicarious liability. 
However, that together with the fact that foster parents cannot be considered 
entrepreneurs provides a strong basis for vicarious liability. As Kidner notes, even if 
a person’s activity is not central to the employer’s enterprise and even if they are not 
regarded as part of the organization for managerial purposes, they can still be 
regarded as an employee provided there is clear evidence that they are not acting as 
an entrepreneur in relation to the defendant’s enterprise. The focus should be on the 
person’s role in the defendant’s enterprise regardless of any formal designation.158 
In this way, courts would have the discretion to make reasonable inferences from the 
nature of particular relationships in light of prevailing social realities in ways that 
achieve justice for all the parties while maintaining vicarious liability’s goal of 
providing effective compensation to innocent victims who become casualties of an 
activity.
The perception and expectation of foster children cannot be ignored in 
determining whether foster parents are “employed” by the Superintendent of Child 
Welfare in order to make the latter vicariously liable for the wrongs of the former. 
Children are placed in the care of adults who are expected to act as their parents and 
give them as “normal” a home life as possible. To the children, foster parents have 
apparent authority over them and that power relationship has been created by the 
Ministry’s conferral of authority on foster parents over the children. It would be a 
fundamental breach of trust for children who are abused or neglected by their 
caregivers to discover that the party that placed them in harm’s way is not 
vicariously liable for the wrongs of the caregivers, has no non-delegable duty 
regarding their safety and well-being in foster care, and that no breach of fiduciary
156 See Locomotive, supra note 99 at para. 19 (P.C.)
157 United Wholesale Grocers v. Sher, 1993 S.L.T. 284 at 285-87.
158 Kidner, supra note 101 at 64.
duty is engaged, especially where the tortfeasors are not capable of compensating the 
plaintiffs. Both Bazley and Critchely support the conclusion that vicarious liability 
should attach where a party has placed the wrongdoer and victim in a parent-like 
relationship that leaves the weaker party vulnerable to abuse even if the wrongful 
conduct in question was for the personal gratification of the tortfeasor and contrary 
to the employer’s enterprise. Although the employment status of the tortfeasor in 
Bazley was not in issue (because he was an employee) the torts in question did not fit 
within the category of conduct traditionally considered to have been committed in 
the course of one’s employment. Yet, vicarious liability was considered appropriate 
in those circumstances because the employer, by creating the parent-like relationship 
between the tortfeasor and victims, enhanced the risk of abuse of the vulnerable 
children left in the charge of the tortfeasor. More importantly, in Critichley, the 
government was held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of a surrogate parent 
although he was explicitly designated as an independent contractor by the terms of 
his contract with the government. From the children’s perspective, the governmental 
employers had placed them in the parent-like situation with the primary tortfeasor. 
Whether or not the nature of the abuse can be considered conduct occurring in the 
course of the tortfeasor’s employment, it is fair that children expect some remedy 
from the person who placed them in the tortfeasor’s care in the first place (given the 
difficulties in proving employers’ negligence that should not be the only viable basis 
of liability). In the same vein, foster children are not privy to the terms of the 
contract between the Superintendent of Child Welfare and foster parents. All they 
know, and probably care about, is that they have been placed by the government and 
would, therefore, expect some remedy for their potential victimization; even in the 
absence of personal fault on the part of the social workers in charge of their 
placement. As well, the power relationship created in such circumstances supports 
imposition of vicarious liability even absent direct supervisory control over the 
activities of the tortfeasor.160 Thus, the foster care cases serve as an excellent 
example of the pressing need for a contextual approach to non-delegable duties and 
imposition of vicarious liability on public authorities.
CONCLUSION
Governments provide a myriad of services that bring their workers in direct contact 
with members of the public. Risk of injury to the public is real. Historically, 
governmental immunity made it difficult for victims injured by government 
employees to obtain a remedy. This created differential treatment among tort victims 
based on the identity of tortfeasors. This inequality became intolerable, especially 
with the increase in governmental activities and widespread recognition of the idea 
of equality before and under the law, resulting in the abolition of governmental 
immunity for the torts of its employees. Other developments that have made it easier 
for plaintiffs to obtain effective remedies include the principles of vicarious liability 
and non-delegable duties that impose liability on employers for the torts of their
159 Critchley, supra note 108 at 118-22.
160 See J.L. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1999) 175 D.L.R. (4th) 559 at 574 (B.C.S.C.).
employees and independent contractors in appropriate circumstances even in the 
absence of personal fault. In order to maintain the continued viability of these 
concepts in modem tort law, courts have adapted the elements necessary to trigger 
liability based on these concepts in light of prevailing social realties.
The growing phenomenon of non-standard workers undertaking jobs in both 
public and private sectors and for whose torts employers are generally not liable 
threatens to undermine these victim-favourable developments unless courts 
reconsider the traditional characterization of workers for both the purposes of 
vicarious liability and for determining when employers owe non-delegable duties to 
victims. Many of the workers now considered independent contractors do not fit the 
traditional understanding of workers in this category, who would often be carrying 
out their own enterprises and were rightly the only ones held liable for the 
materialization of risks associated with their activities. The same is not true of many 
non-standard workers today. Many of these workers find themselves in non-standard 
positions out of necessity and convenience. They are actually being exploited in the 
name of business efficiency and cost cutting measures. Failure to hold the employers 
who actually benefit from the services of these workers liable puts some victims at a 
disadvantage because of the status of the tortfeasors.
In the context of providing public services, the use of non-standard workers 
effectively immunizes governmental authorities from liability for risks associated 
with services the government is mandated to provide, leaving the losses to be 
absorbed by other parties who can least afford it and depriving victims of effective 
remedies. It is problematic for the costs associated with the provision of public 
services to be bome by vulnerable workers who themselves are often being exploited 
or by innocent victims who cannot obtain effective remedies from tortfeasors. This 
phenomenon privatizes the costs associated with the provision of public services. It 
also undermines liability of public authorities and should be avoided through 
contextual analysis of current employment relationships that produce such outcomes. 
Further, it creates inequalities among tort victims depending on the status of workers 
responsible for their injuries.
This is an unfortunate outcome for those placed in harm’s way by public 
authorities when services they are mandated to provide are outsourced to so called 
independent contractors. As has been pointed out throughout this paper, this 
problem is exacerbated by the rising trend in non-standard employment where work 
that would otherwise have been completed by an employer’s employees is contracted 
out to persons who look like independent contractors but can hardly be characterized 
as such in practice. This practice undermines the need for equality of treatment of 
accident victims simply based on the characterization of workers who carry out the 
injury-producing activities. It is also inconsistent with the historical rationale for 
vicarious liability to avoid the disruptive effect of tort liability by ensuring fairness in 
the imposition of liability.
Even if control continues to be perceived as essential to the employer-employee 
relationship, the hallmarks of control should be reconsidered in light of current social 
realities. Specifically, what constitutes control should take account of the uniqueness 
of particular situations to determine what form control may realistically take in 
different contexts. The variety of employment relationships means that there can be 
no universal test of what constitutes the exercise of control by an employer over an 
employee to justify vicarious liability. All these point to the necessity for contextual 
approaches to when vicarious liability should be imposed on an employer and when 
non-delegable duties arise in ways that remain attentive to changing social realities, 
and the goals underlying vicarious liability and non-delegable duties. Inability to 
impose liability on the basis of vicarious liability should not preclude a successful 
claim based on breach of non-delegable duty and vice versa.
